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ABSTRACT
The present study examines the role epidemic diseases, specifically malaria and
bubonic plague, played on the course of the Morean War (1684-1699). The Morean War
was a major offensive by Christian powers, led by the Venetian Republic, against
Ottoman controlled Greece. Christian victories during the war were widely celebrated
across western Europe, but even in victory Christian forces took severe casualties from
multiple disease outbreaks. First, this study seeks to explain the terrestrial and maritime
networks the war was fought over, and how those networks either led the opposing forces
into regions of endemic disease (malaria), or how they allowed other diseases (bubonic
plague), to be distributed around the region. Furthermore, this demonstrates the impact
of epidemic events on the Christian armies and the subsequent prosecution of the war,
and that epidemic disease was a major catalyst behind demographic change in the
Peloponnese, the principal theater of conflict.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
On January 10th, 1690, a flotilla slipped into the Venetian lagoon via the
Malamacco channel, the southernmost access to the maritime republic. A wide array of
shipping entered the lagoons daily, but this was not the usual traffic of merchant vessels
arriving on the Rialto from Alexandria, Marseille, or London; rather it was a fleet of
Venetian warships returning home victorious over the infidel Turks, with the elected
leader of the Republic, Doge Francesco Morosini, commanding. Over the previous five
years, Morosini and the Venetian fleet, aided by numerous Christian allies and
mercenaries, decisively defeated the Turkish forces and pushed them out of the Morea,
the Peloponnese region of southern Greece. The Christian forces were victorious in
sieges of the major ports of the region, including Methoni, Koroni, Navarino and
Nauplion, as well as defeating Turkish field armies in set-piece battles at Kalamata,
Argos, and Patras. The most dramatic turn of the war occurred at Athens in September
1687, when Venetian mortar-rounds struck the Ottoman gunpowder store within the
Parthenon, one of the Seven Wonders of the classical world. The subsequent detonation
levelled the core of the structure, leaving a shell of a building with only a hint at its
ancient grandeur (Mommsen 1941, 544-546). This litany of Christian victories only
ended with the unsuccessful siege of Negroponte in the summer of 1688, but that setback
paled in comparison to the new “Kingdom of the Morea” now incorporated into the
Venetian Stato da Mar, or overseas empire.
Morosini and his fleet returned home unambiguously victorious over the Turks, a
major shift in Venetian fortunes. The Venetian Republic had suffered numerous defeats
at the hands of the encroaching Ottomans over the previous two centuries, which had

gradually eroded their seaborne empire in the Aegean and Ionian seas. Morosini, the
Venetian commander, earned his military reputation during the most recent iteration of
these conflicts, the War of Candia (1645-1669), in which Venice lost control of Crete
after a protracted war of attrition (Setton 1991,104-206). The Morean War provided
Venice an opportunity to satisfy the irredentist impulse to restore their empire to its
former glory. The success of the campaign elicited an enthusiastic response at home, as
evidenced by Morosini’s election as Doge while still on campaign in 1688, and the
conferral of the victory title Peloponnesiacus upon him by a euphoric Senate.
The return of Morosini and his fleet fits into this celebratory scheme, as it was
nothing less than a triumphal cruise. As the fleet made its way home up the Venetiancontrolled Adriatic in the fall of 1689 it was greeted at each port by escorts of local
vessels, cannon-salutes, and jubilant celebrations ashore (Locatelli 1691, II:253-270). Ill
winds slowed the progress of the fleet, but the delay allowed the preparation of a more
elaborate welcome at home. The events of January 10-11th, 1690 were a full-blown
triumphal entry into the city, modelled directly on Roman antecedents. Upon entering
the lagoon Morosini received the welcome of the entire Venetian Senate, the Knights of
San Marco, and all the grandees of the Republic. The next morning, he sailed from the
monastery of S. Nicolo di Lido aboard the Bucintoro, the ceremonial galley of the Doge,
accompanied by ships bearing banners and tapestries portraying his victories, prisoners,
and spoils of war. The civic populace joined the triumphal procession in their gondolas
and sandalos, to the point that “all the inhabitants of Venice were upon the seas.”
(Locatelli 1691, II.271). On arrival at the Arsenale, Venice’s military shipyard, Morosini
found a triumphal arch built in classical styling, flanked by images of both Neptune and
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the Blessed Virgin, mixing Christian and Greco-Roman triumphal religious symbols
(Locatelli 1691, II:275). While originally constructed in paper mâché, a permanent arch
was built within a year, and two classical lions taken from Piraeus, port of Athens,
flanked the arch as trophies of Venice’s military glory. The lions remain there still.
The Venetians heavily publicized their successes during the Morean War, and
much of Christian Europe, whether Catholic or Protestant, consumed news of Turkish
defeats with great enthusiasm. Morosini and other Christian commanders wrote short
accounts of critical sieges and battles, known as relazioni, which were quickly published
as pamphlets and widely translated and disseminated throughout Europe (Moronsini
1685; Corner 1687). Printing houses capitalized on the public fascination with the
conflict by commissioning histories of the war and biographies of Morosini, including
one by Morosini’s secretary, Alessandro Locatelli (1691), as well as Niccola Beregani
(1698) and Antonio Arrighi (1748). By far the most popular work concerning the war
was Memorie istoriografiche de' regni della Morea, Negroponte e littorali fin' á
Salonichi, written by the Venetian friar and cartographer Vincenzo Coronelli (1687). As
a blend of geography with contemporary military history, the Memorie istorigrafiche
included a textual narrative of the conflict accompanied by Coronelli’s own highly
detailed maps and plates. The work was immediately translated into multiple languages
and mass produced, with surviving copies of the book found in the library of John
Adams, and many of the plates feature in the extensive military map collection of King
George III.
The historical image of the Morean War presented in contemporary and later
materials is one of unmitigated Christian triumph over a tyrannical, infidel Empire, and
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the various Christian commanders, from Morosini to his German mercenary
commanders, Maximilian Wilhelm von Brunswick and Otto von Konigsmarck, appear in
these accounts as heroes of Christendom and their respective nations. Yet this
triumphalism obscures the horrendous toll the war took on combatants and noncombatants caught up in the conflict. A careful reading of the battlefield reports, coupled
with extensive census records and maps produced in the decade following the end of
major combat, show devastating mortality rates among the soldiery and extensive
depopulation of the Peloponnese. Despite the celebratory attitude displayed by the
victors, the Morean War was won at a shocking cost, and left the so-called “Kingdom of
the Morea” a desolate landscape.
The epidemic spread of disease among Venetian forces, their allies, and their
Turkish opponents is an aspect of this conflict, that, while noted by both historians and
geographers, has not been properly considered as a central aspect of the campaign.
Disease ravaged the opposing forces, beginning with a malaria outbreak at Corfu in 1684,
and continuing with intermittent bouts of malaria and plague through the end of major
combat operations at Negroponte in 1688 (Setton 1991, 290-91). As the Venetian fleet
and its mercenary army moved from siege to siege, disease followed, devastating the
army, and hampering military operations. As an illustration, out of 3,350 Saxon
mercenaries who joined the Venetians in 1685, only 800 remained during the siege of
Athens two years later (Setton 1991, 299). In fact, the Venetians eventually abandoned
Athens altogether, not due to Turkish military opposition, but because of continued
outbreaks of plague (Setton 1991, 341). Indeed, the Venetians remained cognizant of the
threat of disease in the Morea even as they feted Morosini; the Doge and his fleet were
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forced to undergo the quarantia¸ 40 days of quarantine, at Split before the final leg of
their journey, and they sent ahead sworn documentation asserting the absence of plague
amongst them.
The Morean War significantly impacted the human geography of the
Peloponnese. Much evidence exists for a major demographic decline in the Morea
subsequent to the Morean War, with large numbers of villages abandoned in the 18th and
19th centuries (Wagstaff 1978, 297-98). The mechanism behind these abandonments is
debated, though it is notable that disease, as prevalent as it is in the sources, has not been
discussed as a potential cause. Within this study I seek to answer the following
interrelated research questions:
1.

What environmental and geopolitical factors shaped the movement of people
and goods in the Eastern Mediterranean, and how did these movements impact
conflicts in the region? In other words, what networks did the Venetians and
Ottomans fight over, and how did these networks impact disease occurrence
and mobility?

2. What diseases did Christian forces encounter during the campaign and how
did the subsequent epidemics shape the course of the conflict? How did the
make-up of the Christian armies exacerbate morbidity and mortality during
these epidemics?
3. How can GIS modeling be used to better understand disease risk within the
Ottoman world?
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4. How did this conflict and its attendant epidemics change the human
geography of the Morea? Can we model these changes in the landscape using
GIS programming and methodologies?
The goal of these research questions is to explain the complex interplay of disease,
climate fluctuations coinciding with the 17th century and warfare in changing the human
landscape of the Morea during and subsequent to this conflict, and in turn, how this
changed the fate of two empires. Chapter II examines the environmental factors that
shaped networks of trade and power projection in the Eastern Mediterranean. Control of
these networks was the impetus behind the Morean War, yet these networks also
influenced the propagation of disease among the opposing forces. Chapter III analyzes
the risk of endemic malaria within the combat zones of the Morean War, and how malaria
was an especially deadly pathogen to the Christian forces deployed to the Morea in 16841686, and again in the fall of 1688. Chapter IV discusses the appearance of bubonic
plague in the combat theater in 1687-1688, and will provide GIS modelling of plague risk
in Ottoman Greece, the Balkans, and Anatolia, and propose a more complex
understanding of plague movement across landscapes. Chapter V examines the role of
malaria in the costliest battle of the war, the Siege of Negroponte. Finally, Chapter VI
utilizes post-war Venetian cadastral texts and maps to consider the impact the war and its
attendant epidemics had on the human landscape of the Morea.
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CHAPTER II - THE GEOGRAPHY OF MARITIME EMPIRES IN THE EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN
The city-state of Venice was born of the sea and survived by the sea, so it is no surprise
that over the centuries the Venetians would create a seaborne network of critical ports
connecting them to the trade entrepôts of the eastern Mediterranean. These ports further
linked them to the caravan networks of the Balkans, Anatolia, and the Near East. The
maritime and terrestrial networks of the Eastern Mediterranean are crucial to
understanding the role of endemic and epidemic disease during the Morean War. The
networks Venice and the Ottomans struggled over brought them into direct contact with
endemic diseases in the region, as well as providing efficient networks (sea lanes and
roads) and vectors (fleets, armies, and refugees) for the epidemic spread of some
diseases.
Yet this Stato da Mar, literally an “empire upon the seas”, did not take shape in
the short term, or without physical constraints; rather it evolved organically in the face of
numerous contingent factors, including the maritime space it was built upon. Therefore,
we must examine the Stato da Mar considering the maritime geography and climatology
of the Adriatic, Ionian, and Aegean Seas. In what ways did the annual wind patterns of
the region shape sailing patterns? How did the availability of safe anchorages further
shape the trade lanes? How did sailing practices and technologies limit the range of
choices sailing masters made when embarking on a journey in this region? How did this
maritime network allow access to the land-based trade networks of Southeastern Europe
and the Near East? The Stato da Mar was also created within a temporal framework,
requiring us to acknowledge the contingent geopolitical events that created this empire,
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focusing on the imperial cruise of Doge Pietro II Orseolo down the Adriatic in 1000, and
the Fourth Crusade of 1202-1204. Each of these episodes involved intentional, proactive
measures by Venetian authorities to conquer or otherwise impose their will on spaces
critical to the maintenance of their trade lanes, and when we compare these “imperial
moments” with the maritime geography, we gain a clearer understanding of the Stato da
Mar.
Seafaring in the Eastern Mediterranean
All nautical travel is constrained by natural forces, but premodern sailors, lacking
precise navigational aid, meteorological information, and mechanized engines, were at
the mercy of environmental factors more so than their modern brethren. The movement
of sailing vessels is limited by three basic environmental factors: currents, tides, and
winds. In addition, certain technical factors further burdened premodern mariners,
including the lack of precise navigational aids, the limits of contemporary naval
architecture in the face of bad weather, and the need to revictual frequently to support the
high manpower needs of shipping. Indeed, these geographic and technological issues
impacted sailors globally, but the exact manner they played out varied from region to
region with geographical conditions. How did these factors effect ships and their crews in
the Eastern Mediterranean, and in turn, how did these factors shape the maritime
networks these sailors created?
Currents and Tides
The movement of water, either in the form of surface currents or in tidal action,
can either aid or inhibit ship movement depending upon direction and/or timing. In the
Mediterranean Sea all currents, both surface and subsurface, move in a counterclockwise
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manner. This implies the currents would help east-to-west sailing along the northern
shores of the Mediterranean, and west-to-east sailing on the southern littoral. Sailing in
the opposite direction would appear to hinder movement pattern. Yet this is not the case,
as Mediterranean currents are negligible. The Mediterranean is largely cut-off from the
warm-water circulation patterns of the larger oceans, which generate higher current
speeds. For example, the North Atlantic Current which brings the warm equatorial
waters towards Europe can average up to 6 knots (kt) (11kph). The current speed in the
Mediterranean averages no more than 1 kt (1.85kph), with some localized occurrences of
1.5 kt (Pryor 1989; Thompson and Thompson, 2017). Such a low current speed has little
bearing on sailing practices.
Tidal action is also an important variable for captains to consider, especially when
approaching a safe harbor. The tide cycle can help or hinder a ship during ingress or
egress from an anchorage. Some small harbors or bays may be unusable as an anchorage
at low tide, even leaving a vessel aground. But tidal action is barely present in the
Mediterranean, again a result of the Mediterranean’s enclosed nature. In most
Mediterranean ports, the mean difference between high and low tide is less than 1m, with
little practical impact to sailing practice, although high tide coupled with seasonal sirocco
winds (see below) accounts for tides of higher than 1.8 m in the Venetian lagoons, which
is now responsible for growing frequency of acqua alta flooding in the lagoons (Pryor,
1989; Thompson and Thompson, 2017).
Wind Patterns
The annual cycle of wind patterns in the Mediterranean influences sailing practice
far more than any other environmental factor. Wind behavior, including wind speed,
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direction, and frequency is of paramount concern to the pilot of any vessel.
Mediterranean wind patterns are well documented through both modern data collection as
well as historical attestations of pilots and travelers extending back into Greco-Roman
antiquity. In fact, the historical information we possess suggests no real change in wind
patterns in the Mediterranean throughout recorded history (Murray 1987). The winds
Venetian sailors utilized in the 10th , 13th, or 17th centuries are the same as we experience
today.
To understand the importance of wind patterns, we must understand how sailors
use them in the first place. As long as a wind is blowing, a vessel can find a way to
harness wind power, even if the wind is blowing against the direction of travel. By
tacking, or gybing the sails from port to starboard in a zig-zag pattern, any sailing vessel
can utilize the wind to move in a 270-degree arc. A ship cannot sail directly against the
wind, or within 45 degrees either side of said wind direction, but any pilot can make use
of a wide latitude of wind direction to make headway (Rousmaniere and Smith, 2014).
Yet having the wind as close to dead astern, or “windward”, as possible is advantageous
to any sailing ship, both in terms of providing greater speed and maneuverability.
Mediterranean winds follow certain basic patterns. First, the Mediterranean is
known for calm surface winds, especially when compared to the high windspeeds of the
North Atlantic or Central Pacific, especially during the late spring and summer months
(May – September). Windspeed is rarely above 20 kts during these months. Gale force
winds (above 30 kts) are more common from late October through April, and during the
medieval and early modern period few captains risked their vessels during this time of
year (Heikell and Heikell, 2019; Pryor, 1988).
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Wind direction also follows predictable annual patterns. Copernicus, the
European Union’s online compendium of climate data, shows the mean annual wind
direction of theEastern Mediterranean between 1993 and 2016 is overwhelmingly
northerly, either north-northeast or north-northwest winds. The data confirms the textual
accounts of pilots and travelers from any time in the last 2500 years (Simoncelli et. al.,
2016). The Greeks referred to these as etesian winds, while the early modern Turks call
them meltemi, a term in common usage among sailors today (Heikell and Heikell, 2019).
From time-to-time, these northerlies turn to gale-force winds known as the bora,
occurring with greater frequency during the winter months, further limiting maritime
traffic in that season (Cesini, Morelli and Parmiggiani, 2004). Yet generally the winds
are calm, and any vessel departing from the northern shore of the Mediterranean would
possess the “weather gauge”, the greater freedom of speed and movement afforded by
having the wind astern. John Pryor (1988) asserts that European powers of the
Mediterranean possessed great military and commercial advantages simply by sailing
from windward.
In-shore sailing practices
Pre-modern mariners sailed according to several common practices dictated by
natural and technological limitations. Taken all together these limiting factors resulted in
a near-universal preference for in-shore sailing or sailing within sight of the shoreline.
In-shore channels, or waterways found between landmasses, such as between islands or
islands and the mainland, were even more desirable. Why was this the case?
One reason was ease of navigation. Ancient and medieval sailors lacked even the
most basic navigation tools, such as a compass, astrolabe, or accurate timepieces. Proper

11

navigational charts were non-existent until the appearance of portolan charts in the 13th
century, and these were still tied to visual landmarks (Campbell, 1987). Even after the
invention and proliferation of better navigational technology, the enclosed nature of the
Mediterranean meant that sailors were never far from land in the first place. So coastal
landmarks, especially hilly and mountainous landscapes, acted as the primary waypoints
for pre-modern sailors (Pryor 1988). This is reflected by the portolan charts utilized by
late medieval/early modern sailors. These charts used rhumb lines to show relative
direction towards clearly identifiable coastal landmarks as a way of finding appropriate
harbors (Astengo, 2007). Medieval portolans evolved into “pilots”, printed guides to
local ports first appearing in the 17th century, which combined portolan charts annotated
with soundings and narrative descriptions of ports and headlands, as well as sketched
silhouettes of landmarks and port entrances (Seller 1753). Modern pilots, utilizing up-todate nautical charts and GPS data, still include visual sketches of coastlines so that
mariners can navigate by landscape, especially as they approach anchorages (Heikell and
Heikell, 2019; Thompson and Thompson, 2014).
Proximity to shorelines also enhances sailing efficiency. The daily cycle of
heating and cooling of land and sea produces sea winds, steady winds blowing from sea
to shore, during daylight hours. Sea winds are prevalent from 8:00am to 4:00pm most
days. The cycle reverses with nighttime cooling, with land winds heading out to sea after
sundown. This daily wind cycle can add to the prevailing surface winds, or even provide
mobility in periods of otherwise calm winds. In-shore channels provide an even greater
sea/land wind cycle, as landmasses are on both sides of the channel (Rousmaniere and
Smith 2014). The Adriatic Sea possesses several in-shore channels, including the
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Kvarner and Velebit Channels that act as daily wind funnels, pushing shipping to the
south with relative ease (Marelic 2016).
Sailing vessels also required frequent resupply in the pre-modern era. Fuel was
obviously not an issue, but the heavy manpower needs of a large sailing ship or war
galley necessitated significant provisions of foodstuffs and fresh water. Space was at a
premium in any sailing vessel, and food and water stores took up a great deal of space.
Most medieval and early modern cargo ships needed a minimum of 50 sailors, while war
galleys were especially manpower intensive, with at least 200 oarsmen and marines on
board to properly mobilize the vessel (Lane, 1934). And this only accounts for the
working crew. Merchant vessels frequently carried dozens of passengers, especially
those ships plying the pilgrimage route to the Holy Land. Pryor (1988) calculates that
most medieval ships would run out of fresh water long before food supplies, and on
average needed to replenish their water stores every 3 days. The need for frequent stops
further kept shipping near coastal sources of resupply.
The principal factor keeping mariners close in-shore was safety from storms and
squalls. Compared to the world oceans, the Mediterranean is calm, but bad weather is
still the bane of mariners, as evidenced by the innumerable shipwrecks recorded
throughout the Mediterranean. The winter months experience frequent high-wind bora
and sirocco events that could snap masts or capsize vessels (Marelic 2016). Even during
the calm of the summer sailing season, thunderstorms and squall lines are known to
appear with rapid onset. Galleys and galleasses, noted for their long hulls but low
freeboard, were easily swamped by even the smallest of storms (Lane 1934). The
localized high winds produced in such storms also threaten shipping with the dangers of a
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“lee shore”, a straight coastline perpendicular to the wind direction. A storm can easily
push a ship directly aground on the rocks, shoals, or beaches that make up the lee shore
(Rousmaniere and Smith, 2014).
The Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic Sea, the Ionian Sea, and the Aegean Sea all
exhibit complex maritime environments well suited for maritime traffic. Wind speed and
direction, numerous in-shore channels and the multitude of safe harbors together create
an ideal setting for maritime trade lanes. The Adriatic Sea best illustrates this. Wind
direction and speed is largely uniform across the entire sea, yet the historical trade lanes
are all located on the northeast coastline along Istria and the Dalmatian coastline of
Croatia and Montenegro. Pilots avoided the Italian coastline on the southwestern side of
the sea almost universally. Even ships setting out from major Italian ports like Ravenna,
Ancona, or Bari sailed across the Adriatic to the Dalmatian coastline and only then
proceeded south to the wider Mediterranean world (Faracic, 2014). The network of over
200 safe anchorages on the Croatian mainland and in the Dalmatian islands, coupled with
multiple in-shore channels between island groupings creates a near-ideal maritime route.
By comparison the Italian coastline to the southwest possesses fewer than 50 ports, most
of which feature artificial moles and other structures built in the 19th and 20th centuries
(Thompson and Thompson 2014). Only Ravenna, Ancona, Bari, and Otranto stand out as
natural deep-water ports, so most of the Italian coastline is considered a lee shore.
The Ionian Sea features in-shore channels between the Ionian islands (Corfu,
Lefkada, Kephalonia and Zakynthos) and the mainland, with safe harbor facilities inside
the channels themselves. The principal sailing routes avoid the western side of the
islands and all travel down the in-shore channels (Heikell and Heikell 2019). South of
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the Peloponnese the prescribed route hews near to the Messenian Cape at Methoni, Cape
Matapan, and Cape Malea. Routes diverge from Cape Malea, with one moving eastward
toward the north coast of Crete and on to Rhodes and the Levant, and the other going
northeast to Athens and beyond. The northeastern route continues as an in-shore channel
through the Euboean Gulf, the calm channel between Evia (Venetian Negroponte) and
the Greek mainland. There are no ports on the west coast of Evia, and with prevailing
northeasterly winds this becomes a lee shore, so the eastern channel was preferred in
antiquity and is still advised by modern pilots (Pryor 1988; Heikell and Heikell 2019).
Upon exiting the Euboean Gulf, ships can move directly north to Thessalonika or
northeast to the Dardanelles and Istanbul.
The geography and climatology of the eastern Mediterranean creates a natural
maritime network that can be exploited commercially, politically, and militarily, and can
set the stage for geopolitical competition over control of that network. The Venetian
Republic of the medieval and early modern period, itself a commercial, maritime state,
sought to control the trade routes that were their economic lifeblood. To do so meant
regulating, in some form or fashion, the network of ports in the region and in-shore
channels that connected them. Gradually the Venetians did just that, forming the Stato da
Mar, which reached its greatest extent at the end of the 15th century (Map 1).
Forging the Stato da Mar: Venetian Imperialism from the 10th to 15th centuries.
Venice’s ties to the sea comes from its very origins. Small fishing settlements
existed in the marshes and lagoons at the mouth of the Po River valley from antiquity, but
large populations only migrated to the area due to warfare. The Lombard invasion of 568
CE radically altered the political landscape of northern Italy. The sheer violence of the
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Lombards forced large number of refugees from various cities in northwestern Italy into
the marshes. The Roman populace of Altino fled to Torcello, that of Padua to
Malamacco, Concordia to Caorle, Oderzo to Heraclea, Treviso out to Chioggia, and
Aquileia to Grado (Giovanni Diacono, 1999; Madden, 2013; Hodgson, 1901). These
nascent refugee communities maintained their cultural and political allegiance to the
Byzantine Empire centered on Istanbul, and ocean-going trade in the eastern
Mediterranean quickly became the main economic driver within the lagoons. The
Translatio Sancti Marci, the legendary tale of the arrival of the relics of St. Mark in
Venice in 829, speaks of Venetian merchants visiting Alexandria, where they stole the
body of the Evangelist to boost the religious prestige of their society (McCleary, 1931).
The historicity of this tale is debatable, but the notion that Venetian merchants would
have conducted business in Egypt is believable and belies a historic reality. Alexandria
was not the only entrepôt that attracted Venetian merchants. Trade with Istanbul
predictably grew into the central feature of the Venetian economy, culminating in a
critical trade agreement in 992 that gave Venetians preferential trade status within the
Byzantine Empire (Hodgson, 1901; Lane, 1973). This agreement encouraged further
growth of trade between Venice and the imperial capital (Borsari 1988).
The Imperial Expedition of Pietro II Orseolo
Solidifying trade relations with Istanbul provided the impetus for Doge Pietro II
Orseolo’s campaign to dominate the Adriatic Sea. The many ports along the Dalmatian
coast served as potential safe harbors, but they were also trade rivals. Both Poreč and
Pula on the Istrian coast, a day’s sail from Venice, possessed large deep-water ports and
substantial populations. Zadar, in the very center of the Dalmatian coast, was able to
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control trade lanes to the north and south. Split, founded as the retirement villa of the
Emperor Diocletian (284-305), held the seat of an archbishop, a rival for ecclesiastical
supremacy over Dalmatia against Venice’s own Patriarch. Adriatic ports also provided
haven for pirate bands. Slavic pirates operated out of the Neretva River basin in southern
Dalmatia, and they were joined by Latin-speaking pirates from the nearby island ports of
Korčula and Lastovo. These pirate havens sat astride the major trade routes and exacted a
significant economic toll on shipping in the region. Venetian domination of the Adriatic
was not preordained, and there were many rivals and impediments to Venetian power.
On the Feast of the Ascension (May 9) 1000 CE, just as the sailing season
opened, Doge Pietro II led a fleet of warships out of the lagoons and towards the
northeast coast of the Adriatic. The ostensible purpose of the expedition was to reduce
the threat of the Neretva pirates. The previous year embassies from Zadar and the other
Dalmatian cities came to Venice seeking aid against this common threat (Giovanni
Diacono, 1999, IV.30). The pirate threat provided Orseolo the opportunity to not only
eliminate a danger to Venetian shipping, but to impose Venetian hegemony on the major
ports of the Adriatic. Public expressions of piety by the Doge and his fleet were a major
aspect of the campaign. Orseolo received the banner of St. Mark from the Bishop of
Castello (Venice) as the fleet departed and stopped at Grado to accept a similar banner of
St. Hermagoras from the Patriarch of Grado. The banners signified the supernatural aid
of the patron saints of Venice, but also implied the saints’ favor over and above the
patrons of the Dalmatian cities they sailed to defend.
Orseolo first stopped at Porĕc, where he and his armed bodyguard went ashore to
venerate the relics of St. Maura in the cathedral there, and the next night he slept in the
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monastery of St. Andrew at Pula (Giovanni Diacono, 1999, IV.31). Again, piety coupled
with a show of power. The Doge honored local patron saints, while practically
demonstrating his ability to enter these cities at will with an armed force. These were
acts of religious and political submission to Venice. After a brief stop at Ossero, the fleet
made for Zadar, the most important port of the Dalmatian coastline. Zadar opened its
gates to Orseolo, and he was also greeted by the bishops of Krk and Rab, who had
travelled there specifically to pledge their loyalty to the Venetian leader (Giovanni
Diacono, 1999, IV.31).
Zadar became a forward-operating base for Orseolo. He received intelligence that
a group of Neretvan nobles were returning home from a merchant trip to southern Italy
and armed with this information he dispatched 10 vessels to intercept them. This force
overtook the Neretvans off the island of Sušac, and 40 prisoners of noble birth were taken
prisoner to Trogir. The Neretvan leadership immediately dispatched an embassy to
Orseolo, who released most of the prisoners in return for oaths of submission from the
Neretvan leaders, but retained 6 prisoners as hostages (Giovanni Diacono, 1999, IV.31).
The Neretvan pirates were subdued with little bloodshed, but the island bases of
Korčula and Lastovo remained unchecked. The Venetian fleet sailed on to Trogir and
then Split, where Orseolo received the submission of those cities, as well as that of
Dubrovnik further to the south. He then sailed to Korčula, and in the face of
overwhelming force the city swiftly submitted, but nearby Lastovo did not, resulting in a
short siege. After the city’s water supplies were cut, the populace surrendered and the
walls of Lastovo were demolished to prevent future rebellion (Giovanni Diacono, 1999,
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IV.32). With his mission complete Orseolo and his fleet returned home, following the
same route by which they came.
Orseolo’s expedition of 1000 CE did not create an empire in the classic sense.
The Venetians did not install governors or garrisons in the cities they visited, nor did they
impose direct taxes. Rather this was an exercise in force-projection. By assembling a
significant war-fleet and sailing down the main trade routes, visiting each city and
demanding entrance to them by the Doge and his bodyguard, the Venetians established
the power they were capable of wielding if necessary. The limited violence of the
campaign, including capture of the Neretvan nobility and the siege of Lastovo, further
enhanced the image of a powerful Venice, capable and willing to wield their military
might down the Adriatic. Venice successfully achieved dominance over the Adriatic by
acting dominant over the Adriatic. This would remain the status quo for many centuries.
The Fourth Crusade and the Forging of a Seaborne Empire
The 11th century saw Venetian trade with the Byzantine Empire grow
considerably. Istanbul remained the source of many luxury items that made their way
across Asia via the Silk Road and Byzantine Greece provided a wide array of agricultural
products for Western European markets. Other Italian maritime cities joined the
Byzantine trade as well, including Genoa, Pisa, Amalfi, and Ancona, but none were as
successful as Venice. Venetian success stemmed from its long-standing alliance with
Byzantium, which took on new significance in the late 11th century. The Norman
warlord Robert Guiscard, who already controlled southern Italy, invaded Greece in the
1080s and threatening to topple the Byzantine Empire in its entirety. The threat to the
Venetian economy was twofold. It would end the long-standing and lucrative alliance
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with the Byzantines, yet it would also present a larger geopolitical challenge. If
Byzantium fell to Guiscard, he would then control both the Italian and Greek coastlines at
the opening of the Adriatic, including the Ionian Islands and mainland ports of the
western Greece. This would give Guiscard a chokehold on the trade lanes into and out of
the Adriatic Sea, a strategic disaster for Venice.
Consequently, the Venetians offered significant naval aid to the Byzantines
against the Normans, though at great cost. The Normans ambushed and destroyed a
Venetian fleet at Corfu in 1084, leaving thousands of sailors dead and many more
imprisoned for a long period (Madden 2013). Despite this grim setback for the Venetians,
the Normans ultimately failed in their campaign, and the Byzantine Empire survived. In
return for their military aid, Emperor Alexius I Comnenus bestowed an imperial
chrysobull, or “golden bull” on the Venetians in 1082. The new treaty granted sweeping
economic advantages for Venetian merchants operating within the Empire, most notably
exemption from all customs duties. This effectively placed Venetian merchants at an
advantage over native Byzantine merchants, who were still subject to taxes and customs
imposts (Borsari, 1988; Nicovich, 2009).
Trade within the Byzantine Empire was already critical to the Venetian economy,
yet the chrysobull of 1082 further intertwined the fate of the two states. The 12th century
saw dramatic growth of Venetian power at the economic expense of the Byzantines, and
as a result, tension arose between the erstwhile allies. When Emperor John II Comnenus
revoked the chrysobull in 1118, the Venetians raided the Byzantine coastline until he
restored it. In March 1171 Manuel I Comnenus orchestrated the mass arrest of more than
10,000 Venetian merchants and their households within the Empire, all on the same day,
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severing ties with the Republic for the next decade (Madden 2013). Despite these violent
episodes the two powers generally continued their symbiotic relationship.
The Fourth Crusade (1202-1204 CE) represented the chaotic culmination of these
East-West tensions and inadvertently sparked the creation of a true Venetian seaborne
empire. The crusade was initially called by Pope Innocent III to retake Jerusalem from
the hands of the Ayyubid Sultanate, which had taken the holy city from Christian hands
in 1187. The intended target of the crusade was the Ayyubid base of power in Egypt, and
as such the Pope had recruited the Republic of Venice, led by its nonagenarian Doge
Enrico Dandolo, to supply the naval transport for the planned campaign. Crusaders, most
of whom were of French origin, were instructed to make their way to Venice to join the
combined army and fleet of the crusade (Queller and Madden, 1997).
A series of unanticipated events waylaid the crusade. The Venetian Republic
suspended all overseas trade in 1202 CE in order to assemble or construct an enormous
fleet of more than 400 cargo ships, horse transports and war galleys, with the contractual
understanding that the assembling French crusaders would provide funding for this fleet
upon their arrival at Venice. But by the winter of 1202, the entire crusade seemed bound
to collapse. Fewer than half the expected 35,000 crusaders appeared, and the crusade
verged on the edge of financial ruin, and with it the entire Venetian economy. The
insolvency of the Fourth Crusade set it on a wild series of half-measures intended to save
the crusade but instead culminated in the conquest of Christian Istanbul rather than
Muslim Alexandria (Queller and Madden, 1997).
To forestall the collapse of the crusade, in late 1202 the Venetians suggested the
crusader army aid Venice in reasserting their authority over Dalmatia. Zadar had
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repudiated Venetian control several decades before and the crusading army was a
welcome addition to any Venetian fleet sent against the city. The diversion to Zadar
allowed the Venetians to justify a forbearance on the money the crusaders owed them, as
well as regaining full control of the Adriatic coastline. In short order the combined
crusader/Venetian force seized Zadar and razed the city to the ground, although there was
much controversy concerning a Christian crusade sacking a Christian city (Villehardouin,
2008; Queller and Madden, 1997). Thus, the Republic retained its control of the Adriatic
trade routes.
Yet the crusade still possessed no solution to its financial problems. The crusade
sailed on to Corfu with dwindling hopes of a solution when a solution appeared. Alexius
Angelus, the son of a deposed and imprisoned Byzantine Emperor, arrived at Corfu
promising to pay the crusaders’ debts and even join the crusade himself if they would
help restore him and his family to the Byzantine throne. As this was the only option
available, the crusaders agreed, and the Fourth Crusade set sail for Istanbul. In April
1203, the crusaders successfully placed prince Alexius on the throne as Emperor Alexius
IV with relative ease, but Alexius soon discovered that the imperial treasury was bare,
leaving no money to fulfill his lavish promises to the crusade. The next year saw
increasing tensions between the crusade, the emperor, and the larger Byzantine populace.
The result was a crusader assault on Istanbul in April 1204, capturing the city and, in
theory, the entire Empire (Villehardouin, 2008; Queller and Madden, 1997).
Just prior to the final assault on Istanbul the crusader and Venetian leadership met
to determine the outcome of a successful attack. The division of the Empire was the
principal subject; who would get what loot and what lands? The resulting treaty, the
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Partitio terrarium imperii Romaniae, paid off the debt owed to the Venetian Republic by
the crusaders and gave them half of any remaining monetary spoils. But it also gave
them their choice of 3/8ths of the lands of the Byzantine Empire (Tafel and Thomas,
1856). It is rare that an imperial power can determine the shape of their empire at one
sitting; most empires develop over long periods and are formed through many
unforeseen, contingent events. In this instance the Venetians had an unprecedented
opportunity to shape a seaborne empire at one stroke
The choices made in the Partitio terrarium imperii Romaniae are telling. The
foremost prize named therein was a vast trading quarter in Istanbul itself, comprising
nearly a quarter of the city along the shorefront of the Golden Horn, the prime shipyard
facilities in the region (Tafel and Thomas, 1856; Janin, 1964). The Venetians then chose
a series of port cities along the northern coastline of the Sea of Marmara and the
Dardanelles, including Perinthus, Theodosiopolis, Rodosto and Gallipoli. These ports
were common waystations for ships heading through the straits to Istanbul, and Venetian
presence here also indicated its naval dominance of the final leg of the route.
Venice next laid claim to the ports of Oreos and Karystos, located respectively at
the northernmost and southernmost points of Negroponte. The bulk of Negroponte was
assigned to Boniface of Montferrat, a major Crusader warlord, but the Venetians needed
ports governing the Euboean Gulf between Negroponte and the Greek mainland, the
safest in-shore channel in the Aegean Sea. With these ports the Venetians effectively
controlled ingress and egress from the channel, a major strategic advantage. Further
south they also claimed rights to the western half of the Peloponnese. This encompassed
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Methoni and Koroni at the tip of the Messenian peninsula, where the Ionian Sea turned
eastward into the Aegean proper, as well as Navarino Bay, a large and safe anchorage.
The Venetians also sought control of the entire littoral of the Ionian Sea. They
demanded all ancient Epirus, which included much of modern Albania and northwestern
Greece. This claim encompassed mainland anchorages at Lepanto on the Ionian Gulf,
Preveza on the Gulf of Arta, and Vlorë and Durazzo further north in Albania. The treaty
also granted Venice the key Ionian islands, including Zakynthos, Kephalonia, Lefkada,
and Corfu (Tafel and Thomas, 1856). Control of the Ionian islands, together with the
mainland ports, established control of the safer in-shore channel that ran down the eastern
side of these islands, creating a kind of maritime chokepoint that governed access to the
Adriatic Sea. Indeed, the Venetians came to know Corfu as the “door of the Republic”,
vital not only for forward control of the sea-lanes but also as a defensive bulwark for
Venice itself (Longnon ,1964).
The Partitio terrarium imperii Romaniae granted the Venetian Republic the right
to seize the enumerated territories; conquering and controlling these regions was another
matter. The Venetians failed to conquer some of the lands they claimed, yet were able to
seize other areas not named in the Partitio. Much of Epirus and the western Peloponnese
remained beyond Venetian control, though the major ports, like Methoni and Koroni,
were taken quickly and held for centuries. In addition, the Venetians negotiated the
purchase of Crete from Boniface of Montferrat in 1205, securing ports vital to east-west
shipping towards Anatolia and the Holy Land. They also established a power-sharing
agreement with crusader lords on Negroponte, further securing Venetian control of the
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ports along the Evia channel, as opposed to crusader sovereignty over the rural territories.
Venice eventually gained full control of the island by 1390 CE (Thiriet, 1959).
The Fourth Crusade, at one historical juncture, granted Venice maritime
dominance in the northeast quadrant of the Mediterranean. In short order, Venice seized
control of the major in-shore channels preferred by mariners, including the one passing
through the Ionian islands and the important maritime juncture at the Evia channel. The
Dardanelles and the approaches to Istanbul also were under the watchful eye of the
Republic. Rarely in the history of empires has a state gained such considerable strategic
dominance at one blow.
The Rise of the Ottomans and the Twilight of a Seaborne Empire
The Republic maintained its seaborne empire and dominance of the eastern trade
lanes with little interruption for more than 250 years. The rise of the Ottoman Empire
over Anatolia and portions of the Balkans radically changed the geopolitical situation in
the Mediterranean in the late-15th century. The fall of Istanbul in May 1453 signaled the
rise of a new imperial power in the region, and in swift succession the Ottomans began
dismantling the Stato da Mar. Sultan Mehmet II, conqueror of Istanbul, led a major force
to Negroponte in 1470, seizing the city and butchering the defenders after a difficult
siege. This robbed the Republic of control of the strategic Euboean Gulf. In 1499
Ottoman forces struck into the Ionian Sea, defeating two Venetian fleets off the
Messenian peninsula, and capturing Methoni, Koroni, and Lefkada. The Ottomans
besieged Kephalonia and Naupaktos, but both strongholds held out. Despite these small
victories Venice clearly no longer possessed a monopoly over the Ionian trade lanes
(Lane 1974; Madden 2013).
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The Republic spent much of the 16th and early 17th centuries trying to adapt their
mercantile empire to the new geopolitical realities of the Mediterranean World. There
was no doubt that the Ottoman Empire was the juggernaut of the region, and the
Venetians preferred to negotiate and maintain as much of their trade as possible. Venice
waged war against the Ottomans in exceptional circumstances, such as joining the Holy
League of 1570-71 that resulted in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, (Lane 1974; Madden
2013). However, the simple reality was that Venice, no longer holding a monopoly over
the eastern trade-lanes, was in a weak position vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, and peace
with the Turks was more expedient that constant warfare (Setton, 1991).
The long peace ended in 1645, when Sultan Murad IV invaded Venetian Crete
and began the siege of Candia, the principal maritime base on the island. Thus began the
War of Candia (1645-1669), a kind of twilight struggle between two weakening states.
The court of Sultan Murad was beset by internal dissension, and the Venetian Republic’s
economic power dwindled in face of a shift in trade towards the Atlantic. Although the
ostensible cause of the war involved reciprocal bouts of piracy, the reality is that
domestic political weakness pushed both states towards a long war (Lane 1974; Setton
1991). The War of Candia became a war of attrition with numerous major naval battles
across the Aegean and tens of thousands of mercenaries and other levies deployed to
Crete. Bouts of plague killed far more soldiers and sailors than combat, and eventually
the Republic was forced to cut its losses, surrendering Candia and all of Crete to the
Turks in 1669 (Anderson 1952). But given the close-run nature of the war, the Venetians
harbored very real hopes of restoring their empire in the near term. The Ottoman Empire,
despite its eventual victory in Crete, seemed vulnerable, and the Venetian Republic
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looked for an opportunity to exploit any Turkish weakness to their advantage. As we will
see in Chapter Three, the Morean War would be born of just such opportunism.
Visualizing Trade Networks in the Eastern Mediterranean
The maritime imperialism that provoked the Venetian-Ottoman Wars of the 15th
to 18th centuries centered upon control of a network of clearly delineated trade routes.
These networks are significant to the current study not only because of the military
struggle over them, but because these networks also existed alongside reservoirs of
endemic disease and enabled the spread of epidemic disease. Armies and fleets moving
along the network moved from areas of relative health into areas rife with a particular set
of endemic maladies, and in some cases carried said diseases along with them as they
moved down the network, creating an epidemic. By utilizing network analysis tools built
into ArcGIS Pro 2.9, we can conceptualize these networks and quantify the most critical
nodes and connections between them. In turn this allows us to visualize the movement of
not only everyday trade, but that of armies, foodstuffs, ammunition, and refugees, as well
as various forms of pestilence.
The network analysis had 2 stages. The first stage involved constructing a
network dataset within the ArcGIS Pro Link Chart tool, consisting of nodes (cities and
ports) and the vertices (overland or oversea routes) connecting them. The locations of
principal roadways through Ottoman Anatolia and Rumelia have changed little, if at all,
since classical antiquity, so the overland networks were compiled utilizing the Barrington
Atlas of the Greco-Roman World (Talbert 2000), as well as the maps produced by the
Expédition Scientifique de Moree (Guizot 1855). Nodes were identified as major urban
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Map 1. The Venetian Stato da Mar c. 1684.

centers along the caravan routes, and they were linked according to their physical
location and proximity along the known road networks.
Identifying nodes along the maritime network proved more difficult.
Theoretically a sailing vessel could proceed directly to its ultimate destination without
stopping at intervening ports, yet due to various environmental and human factors this is
not how ship-pilots operated in the period between the 15th and 18th centuries.
Navigational hazards, avoidance of storms or military threats, ill-winds, local trade
opportunities, and the need for revictualling all forced captains to stop at ports frequently,
often every several days. Within these variables the complex coastlines of Adriatic,
Ionian and Aegean Seas offered innumerable bays, inlets, and safe in-shore channels as
potential anchorages (Heikell and Heikell 2019; Thompson and Thompson 2014). The
wide availability of safe harbors, as well as the technical ability to sail past such harbors
under ideal sea-keeping conditions, potentially complicates creating a suitable link
network. For example, a ship leaving Venice and sailing down the Adriatic had the
option of several Istrian ports for a first night’s anchorage, including the major ports of
Poreč, Rovinj and Pula, and the smaller harbors at Umag or Novigrad. From the Istrian
coastline they could stop over at the Oser anchorage or proceed directly to Zadar.
Indeed, captains and pilots had numerous options available to them in their navigational
planning.
Despite these complexities, a standard network of sea-lanes and ports is
discernible. Certain ports, due to geographic, environmental, and geopolitical conditions,
were more frequently utilized than others, and this is readily apparent in pre-modern and
modern sources (Pryor 1989, 18-21; Marelic 2016, 228). Pilgrimage accounts from the

15th to 17th century record a standard route from Venice to the Levantine coastline, with
remarkably similar itineraries between them (Faracic 2014, 40-45).
Early modern portolan charts specifically list the major ports of a region (Ash
2007; Astengo 2007), while contemporary pilots, notably that of Jonathan Sellers (1753),
describe in detail the major sea-lanes and the preferred harbor facilities throughout the
region. Modern scholarship on trade in the Eastern Mediterranean confirms the
economic patterns found in these sources (Borsari 1988; Thiriet 1959). The seaborne link
network is substantially more complex than that of the overland routes, but still provides
clear patterns for analysis.
The resulting conceptualized network (Map 2) interlinks the road network (red)
with the sea-lanes (blue) via port cities. The completed network was then analyzed using
the Link Analysis Toolbox in ArcGIS Pro 2.9. Centrality Analysis is the most relevant
method to employ in this study, as it is specifically designed to identify the most
important or influential nodes within a particular network (ESRI 2020). Two distinct
types of centrality tools were applied here, starting with Degree Centrality, which simply
calculates the number of immediate connections a node has to the rest of the network,
indicating the potential impact a single node may have on the network. The Betweenness
Centrality tool was also used, calculating how often each node in the network is on the
shortest path between all other nodes in the network. A high betweenness score suggests
that a particular node acts as a bridge or chokepoint, having greater influence within the
overall network.
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Map 2. Networks in the Eastern Mediterranean, showing land route/nodes (red) and maritime routes/nodes (blue).

Table 1. Degree Centrality

Node
Ismir
Istanbul
Corfu
Patras
Zadar
Pylos
Nafpaktos
Koroni
Thessalonike
Preveza
Kephalonia
Negroponte
Cannakkale
Zakynthos
Methoni
Lefkada
Dubrovnik
Chania
Candia
Vlore

Table 2. Betweenness Centrality

Degree Centrality
17
15
15
11
10
10
10
10
9
9
9
9
9
8
8
8
8
8
8
7

Node
Ismir
Kythera
Istanbul
Corfu
Antalya
Cannakkale
Latakia
Thessalonike
Koroni
Dubrovnik
Zadar
Pylos
Usak
Konya
Edessa
Methoni
Negroponte
Trabzon
Sinop
Antakya

Betweeness Score
1
0.65642
0.59595
0.44913
0.42025
0.41529
0.35185
0.33579
0.28688
0.27303
0.24393
0.23822
0.17287
0.166
0.16033
0.14974
0.14963
0.14001
0.13719
0.13352

Map 3. Detail of Aegean Networks and their connections to Anatolia, Greece, and the Peloponnese.

Several distinct patterns emerge. Both the Degree Centrality (Table 1) and
Betweenness Centrality (Table 2) analyses place Izmir in the top spot, with 17 direct
connections at a betweenness score of 1. Izmir is a critical port on the west coast of
Anatolia, dominating the sea-lanes of the eastern Aegean and providing direct access to
the fertile valleys and urban centers of Anatolia (Frangakis-Syrett 2001, 110). Istanbul
comes in third, with 15 direct connections and a “betweenness” score of 0.59595,
reflecting its placement at the juncture of Europe and Asia by land and the maritime
intersection of the Black and Aegean Seas. Thessaloniki has fewer direct connections (9)
but scores a high “betweenness” score (0.33579), demonstrating its access to the Aegean
and the Balkan hinterlands. Indeed, Izmir, Istanbul and Thessaloniki are each highly
influential as port cities linking inland centers with the maritime network. Koroni,
Methoni, and Pylos in the southwestern Peloponnese and Antalya in southwest Anatolia
illustrate this same principle on a lesser scale, acting as more localized intersections
between land and sea.
The island port of Corfu is an example of a key node located solely on the
maritime network. The entire island, nestled parallel to the Balkan mainland, provides a
wide anchorage on a safe in-shore channel, with access to both the Adriatic and Ionian
portions of the maritime network. With 15 direct connections and a “betweenness” score
of 0.44913, control of Corfu provided immediate access to the Ionian islands, the Gulf of
Arta, the Gulf of Lepanto, as well as entry into the Adriatic and its cluster of ports. Corfu
truly was the “door of the Venetian Republic” and immensely important to Venetian
imperial strategy (Gertwagen 2007, 183). Similarly, Negroponte controls movement
through the Gulf of Evia, the in-shore channel between the island of Evia and Attica on
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the Greek mainland. This route was long preferred as a north-south course from Crete
into the eastern Aegean due to the placid waters of the narrow, protected channel (Heikell
& Heikell 2018, 333-334). The small island of Kythera, with fewer direct connections (6)
still scored second on the “betweenness” scale (0.65642) as it straddles the transition
from the Ionian to the Aegean Sea, and virtually all maritime traffic had to pass near this
small island, as it served as the only safe harbor between the Peloponnese and the ports of
Crete. In fact, Venetian ambassadors returning from various eastern locales often
quarantined on Kythera prior to their return to the Rialto, indicating that the island served
as an essential chokepoint in disease surveillance and control (Locatelli 1691, I: 50).
Centrality Analysis provides a useful mechanism to quantify the relative influence
of various nodes along geopolitical networks in the Eastern Mediterranean. However,
there are limitations, as it is impossible to mathematically measure any number of
political, military, economic and cultural factors that influenced the decision making of
travelers on the network. A prominent example is the relative importance/influence of
Istanbul vs. Izmir. Per the Centrality Analysis, Izmir is the most influential node in the
network dataset, and its overall importance as a port is confirmed by contemporary
sources (Seller 1753, 75; Rycaut 1667). Yet did Izmir overshadow Istanbul as a network
node in actual practice, as implied by the current analysis? Istanbul, as the imperial
capital of successive empires, exerted a kind of gravitational force upon the empire it
ruled and even beyond, attracting all manner of people and goods to the city due to its
political, economic, and cultural significance. The sheer size of its population (700,000)
entailed extensive importation of food and other commodities, and the imperial elite who
ruled from there consumed large quantities of luxury items. Furthermore, Istanbul was
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the hub of the Ottoman military machine, with all arsenals, foundries, shipyards,
warehouses, and barracks centralized at or in the immediate vicinity of the capital. This
concentration of military industries entailed a funneling of vast amounts of supplies and
manpower to Istanbul itself, and virtually all Ottoman military expeditions set out from
there (Imber, 2009). These compounding factors enhance the centrality of Istanbul in a
way that cannot be modeled within the bounds of current Link Analysis tools. As we will
demonstrate, Istanbul proved to be the primary distributor of bubonic plague, in addition
to its role in distributing goods and projecting military power.
Mediterranean Climatology and the Impact of the “Little Ice Age”
In December 1684, not long after combat operations in the Morea War
commenced, the Republic of Venice concluded a mercenary contract with Ernst August,
Duke of Brunswick-Lunberg in northern Germany, for the hire of 2400 musketeers.
Meant to supplement Venetian forces, this force of professional soldiers, commanded by
the duke’s youngest son, Maximilian Wilhelm, immediately began the long march to
Venice for the 1685 campaigning season (Finlay,1877; Setton, 1991). What is most
striking is that this contingent set off in the middle of an especially extreme winter. The
winter of 1684-1685 saw extreme cold weather extending across northern and into
southern Europe, freezing the Thames River at London and the lagoons at Venice alike
(Camuffo et. al., 2019). It seems reckless for a mercenary force to march through this
winter and cross the Alpine passes, even for a considerable sum of money.
In fact, by 1684 such an extreme winter was not unusual, and the German
mercenaries were used to contending with all manner of poor weather, as they lived in the
period scholars now refer to as the Little Ice Age. The Little Ice Age (hereafter LIA)
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refers to a long-term period of global cooling, beginning c. 1350 CE and continuing
intermittently through c. 1850 CE. The cooling period reached its nadir in the mid-17th
century, resulting in expanding glaciers, denser oceanic ice packs, and cooler growing
seasons across the globe. Scholars posit several interconnected causal factors behind this
climatic change, including diminished solar radiation, changes in the axial tilt of the
planet, increased solar veiling due to volcanic activity, and/or changes to oceanic
circulation (Matthews and Briffa, 2005). Regardless of the specific causes, this cooling
pattern and its 17th century nadir is well established in both contemporary documents and
in current scientific scholarship.
The global cooling minimum historically coincides with the Iron Century, a
designation contemporary to the period denoting wide-spread, long-term conflict across
Europe, the Near East, East Asia, and the New World (White, 2011; Parker, 2013). The
many rebellions and large-scale wars of the period have attracted a great deal of attention
from historians, but recently scholars have probed the possible links between a cooling
climate and these various conflicts. Is there an historical nexus of climate change,
famine, and epidemics, with wide-spread violence? The correlation between these
heightened societal stressors and subsequent warfare seems obvious but demonstrating
the causal links among such complex factors proves difficult.
The Morean War, and the epidemics attendant to it, played out in the distinct
climatological environment of the Eastern Mediterranean, classified as a Mediterranean
hot-summer climate (Csa) according to the current Köppen climate classification system.
(Berg et. al., 2018). The Csa coding generally refers to a region with average monthly
temperatures above 22o C in the summer, and monthly averages between 0o and 18o C in
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the winter. Precipitation in the summers is negligible, mirroring arid or semi-arid
environments, with most rainfall occurring in the fall, winter, and early spring (Kotteck
et. al., 2006). Consequently, the agriculture of the region adapted to these climatological
norms, centering around the Mediterranean Triad of durum wheat, olive groves and
viticulture. The Triad was supplemented by other grain crops (millet and barley), as well
as legumes and squash.
While each of these crops is well adapted for arid summers, they still require a
level of moisture for germination and growth and remain susceptible to drought
conditions. This is especially true of durum wheat, the principal source of complex
carbohydrates in the Mediterranean diet. Typically, two crops of durum were planted
annually, in the spring and summer. Given the arid nature of the region, stored moisture
in the soil, a holdover of the rainy season, sustained these crops during dry periods.
Winter wheat relies on summer and fall rains for sustenance, while spring wheat depends
on winter rains. Hence drought conditions, even those outside of the normal growing
season, have a direct impact on soil moisture and in turn crop yields (Saadi et. al, 2015;
Yang et. al., 2019). Repeated annual seasons of drought could impact other crops as
well. Olive trees, notoriously long-lived and difficult to kill, suffer extensive internal dry
rot and gas embolisms during recurring cycles of drought, damaging or killing the tree
and significantly reducing olive yields (Trambley et. al., 2020).
The historical and scientific evidence we possess strongly indicates a repeated
cycle of colder, wetter winters coupled with summer droughts in both the Balkans and
Anatolia during the LIA, and especially during the 1680s. Military affairs dominate the
written sources, especially the various historical chronicles of the period, yet a careful
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review of a wider array of sources, including personal letters, diplomatic reports, and
legal documents exposes less glamorous details of the period, including significant
weather events. Mrgic’s recent work (2018) demonstrates the importance of such
historical documents. Working with a variety of detailed sources from civic institutions
in Serbia and religious houses on the Dalmatia coast, he uncovers numerous accounts of
extreme weather conditions during the 17th century. Several common patterns appear in
these sources. First, extremely cold winters froze even large rivers like the Danube for
some weeks. Harsh winters were invariably followed by heavy spring floods, likely the
result of heavy snow-packs melting in the Carpathians and the Dinaric Alps. Finally, the
summers were hot and extremely dry. These scenarios present themselves frequently
during the 17th century, but are especially pronounced in the 1680s, which coincides with
the Morean War. Mrgic notes that the various writers were cognizant of the additional
societal impacts meteorological events brought, especially to agriculture. Floods swept
away freshly planted fields and droughts withered crops long before harvest, and the
resulting famine conditions disrupted normal social and political life. Reports of
brigands in the countryside and revolts against local authorities abound in these sources,
all a direct result of the collapse of agriculture (Mrgic, 2018). This in addition to the
large, state-sponsored armies passing through and fighting within these very regions.
Scientific evidence confirms the historical sources. A palynological study from
the lower Sava valley in Serbia, corresponding to one of Mrgic’s documentary study
areas, clearly shows a pattern of frequent erosions caused by recurrent flooding coupled
with periods of severe drought. The abandonment of farmland is evident, likely a
consequence of both the environmental stressors and frequent warfare moving through
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the region (Kulkarni et. al., 2018). Sediment cores taken from the lagoon of Butrint, a
Venetian port located along the Ionian Sea in modern Albania, provide further evidence
of heavy winter rains and spring run-off from substantial snow-packs. Heavy clastic
build-up in the lagoon indicates extensive fluvial action from the surrounding watershed
(Morellon et. al., 2016).
Similar climatological impacts are seen in Italy. Research conducted around the
Sicilian town of Pergusa shows drought conditions for the LIA period, though not to the
degree found in the Balkans (Sadori, 2016). It is notable that major socio-political
upheaval occurred in the region in the 17th century, possibly indicating greater climate
change in the region than is currently in evidence (Parker, 2013). A study focusing on
communities in the Central Italian highlands shows a mixture of heavy winter rains
coupled with extreme summer aridity. However, the response of the local population was
substantially different; rather than succumbing to the environmental stressors, they
adapted. The local populace engineered various hydraulic technologies to move water
from highland catchments to irrigate the upland valleys (Mensing, 2016). Climate change
does not condemn a society to inevitable chaos.
The LIA is further evidenced in Greece, the epicenter of the Morean War. One
major study reconstructs premodern sea-surface temperatures (SSTs) for the Northeastern
Aegean Sea using multiproxy evidence, including seabed sediment cores, pollen core
samples from the nearby Rhodope mountains, speleothem deposits from Anatolian and
Thracian caves, and lake sediment cores from Anatolia. The high-resolution seabed core,
taken offshore from Mount Athos (Greece), provides decade-level data, with the other
proxies used as verification. The study concludes that the period from 1600 to 1750 AD
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saw a +/- 1.5 degree Celsius drop in SST, a direct correlation to the LIA (Gogou et. al.,
2016). This study shows the drop in temperature, but not what wider environmental
effects lower temperatures caused. Quaternary evidence from Stymphalia in the
Peloponnese provides a localized answer. The lake-core evidence from this highland
lake shows periods of alternating humidity and aridity across several millennia, as well as
changes to local agriculture. In the LIA period the lake completely dried up and
palynological evidence indicates diminished agriculture in the region, quite like other
evidence from the Balkans noted above (Seguin et. al., 2019).
The Balkan Peninsula clearly experienced significant cooling in the LIA period;
multiproxy evidence indicates extremely cold, wet winters, heavy spring floods, and
drought-ridden summers. The Old World Drought Map (OWDA) further confirms that
the region suffered major environment change (Cook, et. al., 2020). The OWDA uses
dendrochronological data to reconstruct a Palmer Drought Sensitivity Index, or PDSI for
Europe, North Africa, and the Near East across the past 2000 years. These PDSI scores
reflect a supply-and-demand model, combining local precipitation supply with the needs
of local soils, allowing for a common model applicable to many different landscapes,
local climates, and soil types. The resulting PDSI map for the Balkans shows severe
drought across the region during the very years major combat was taking place in Greece,
1684-1688, further indication of the impact of the LIA (Maps 4a-4e).
Ottoman Anatolia exhibits climate trends like those in the Balkans. As noted
above, Anatolia was the lifeblood of the Ottoman military machine, providing the
conscript manpower that filled the ranks of the army and navy, timber for naval stores,
and meat and grain to feed the troops. These critical elements all funneled towards the
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center of the empire, Istanbul itself (White, 2011). The imperial capital served as the
center of the Sultan’s power. From the Topkapi Palace, the Sultan and his court
exercised control over an extensive bureaucracy that harnessed these resources into a
series of military barracks and state-owned factories, foundries, and arsenals. This
centralized control was not only meant for efficiency, but for loyalty; under the watchful
eye of the Sultan and his court, the military forces of the empire were less likely to revolt,
at least in theory (Imber, 2009).
However, this centralized system of military procurement suffered from inherent
weaknesses. First, by relying on resources from one region, the Ottoman leadership ran
serious risks if those resources failed to materialize. They had no fallback source. These
risks were further exacerbated by Istanbul being the sole logistical hub. All the supply
routes funneled to the capital, and even if the needed men and material existed, they had
to travel across a limited number of precarious routes to get to the depots of Istanbul.
Without alternate destinations, the blocking of any of these roads, bridges or mountain
passes could spell disaster for the Sultan (White, 2011). Finally, by concentrating all of
these resources in Istanbul, disease could spread more easily. Men and rodents,
effectively mobile biological hazards, moved along the same routes and concentrated at
the same destination, creating the perfect environment for epidemic transmission of a
variety of diseases (Varlik, 2015).
These weaknesses became apparent in the 17th century. There were repeated
instances of rebellion in the Anatolia countryside throughout the century, known to
contemporaries as the Celali Rebellions. Celali were bands of landless young men in
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43

rural areas of Anatolia that rose in rebellion against the Ottoman imperial government,
often with the encouragement of Sufi mystic-preachers. While scholars have often noted
the rebellions and their religious undercurrents, they have failed to fully explain why so
many landless, disenfranchised males existed to rebel in the first place. Sam White’s
work (2011), influenced heavily by that of Geoffrey Parker (2013), focuses on the
collapse of agriculture in Anatolia due to the LIA, which consequently left many young
men without a livelihood. These environmental factors, coupled with apocalyptic
religious fervor, created a potent mix for rebellion. This serves as an example of how
climate impacts social, economic, and political life.
As in the case of the Balkans, scientific evidence corresponds closely with
traditional historical evidence. Several sediment-core studies, examining pollen and
isotope data, provide good evidence of LIA impacts across Anatolia. Two such studies
located in NW Anatolia, one at Lake Cubuk (Ocakoglu et. al., 2015) and another at Lake
Iznik (Ulgen et. al., 2012), show similar results. In both cases the advent of the LIA in
the region circa 1600 CE coincides with greater aridity, with the water level of both lakes
decreasing and local vegetation changing. Vegetation shifted away from cereal crops
towards shrubbery and pine forests, indicative of diminished agriculture. Another lake
core study from Cappadocia in central Anatolia showed no major disruptions during the
period of the LIA. This may indicate a lack of major change to agricultural output in this
region, but it cannot be said to apply to all of Anatolia (England and Haldon, 2012). But
there were major climate impacts in Cappadocia. Altin and Kayas’ (2020) recent work
utilizes high-resolution DEM and topographic data to study snowpack and glacial
formation during the LIA in the mountainous regions of Cappadocia. The authors note
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that many of the major supply routes funneling foodstuffs towards Istanbul converged in
the Cappadocian highlands, and expanding glaciers had a direct impact on various
mountain passes. They identify several moraines, ridges of sedimentary rock formed by
glacial movement, in critical highland valleys, that date to the LIA. In a world with premodern transportation infrastructure, the movement of people and good was definitively
impacted by shifts in long-term weather patterns.
As with the Balkan example, Anatolia experienced significant cooling during the LIA,
resulting in heavier winter precipitation and more arid summers. Data from the OldWorld Drought Map (Cook et. al., 2020) bears this out again (Maps 5a-5e). Societal
upheaval in the form of the Celali Rebellions aligns closely to increasing environmental
stressors resulting from the LIA. Furthermore, the spread of bubonic plague can be tied
to environmental change. Nukhet Varlik’s work on disease in early-modern Anatolia
(2015) identifies near-constant outbreaks of bubonic plague in the region. Rodents, the
principal carriers of the plague, have a symbiotic relationship with human societies,
feeding off human food supplies. Disruptions to agriculture not only disrupt human
societies, but rodent colonies as well, and as groups of humans move, either as soldiers,
rebels or refugees, rodents and their plague-bearing fleas follow with them. It seems
likely that Ottoman armies moving out of Anatolia into the Morea to fight the Venetian
invasion carried the plague there with them.
Given the historical and scientific evidence that we possess, we can make several
broad conclusions with confidence. First, the Little Ice Age had a demonstrable impact
on the climate of the Northeast Mediterranean. The general climate trends include a drop
in temperature, with more extensive winters. The colder temperatures were accompanied
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by heavier winter precipitation, thicker snow-packs, and expanding glaciation. This
resulted in more extreme spring floods in various river valleys. Summers saw
widespread and long-term drought conditions. Various proxy evidence, especially pollen
cores and isotope data, show degradation of human agriculture, both in cereal crops and
in viticulture (Kulkarni et. al., 2018). As noted, the scientific data corresponds closely
with historical accounts of extreme weather events and the growth of societal chaos
(Camuffo et. al., 2019). This is especially true of the 1680s when the Morean War was
underway.
The coincidence of major climate change with famine, pestilence, revolution, and
warfare is well known to scholars (Appleby, 1980; Iyigun, Nunn and Qian, 2017;
Rosenzweig and Marston, 2018). The general connection between environmental
stressors and the subsequent breakdown of human societies is obvious, yet there remain
questions as to exactly how these breakdowns came about. For example, Sam White’s
work (2011) on the Celali Rebellions in Anatolia makes a clear connection between
climate change and revolution. But these rebellions had a strong element of Sufi
mysticism. How did environmental stressors impact religious ideology? Another
question raised is why did major, state-on-state warfare continue to take place, and even
accelerate, in periods of inclement weather and epidemic disease? Disease was the major
cause of death in all wars of the 17th century (Parker, 2013), including the Morean War
(Setton, 1991), and this was a known factor to the military commanders in the field and
the governments they served. It seems counterintuitive to continue fighting in the midst
of multiple natural disasters, yet the various powers of Europe and the Near East never
considered ceasing or even pausing their military operations. To what degree did
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inclement weather and epidemic disease impact military decisions, if at all? What, if any,
measures were taken to mitigate the impact of disease and weather on the armies, and
were these measures effective in any way? These specific questions are relevant,
especially in a world where we now face both climate change, pandemic disease, and
simmering geopolitical tensions.
Conclusion: Chapter II
As we have seen, the Eastern Mediterranean environment of the 17th century was
characterized by intricate networks connecting urban centers across both land and sea,
allowing for the movement of people and goods, as well as the projection of imperial
power. Control of these networks was a principal cause of imperial conflict in the early
modern period, especially between the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Turks. These
networks were both the catalyst for warfare as well as the landscape upon which these
wars were fought. It is also notable that some nodes in these networks exerted more
influence than others. By utilizing Centrality Analysis tools, we can conceptualize the
relative importance of some nodes over others, and perhaps understand an individual
node’s role in distributing people, goods, and for the purposes of this study, disease
across the larger network.
These networks existed within a changing environment. There is no doubt that
the LIA produced long-term effects across the globe (Parker, 2013; White, 2017), but
there is considerable scientific and historical evidence for immediate climate impacts on
the Eastern Mediterranean during the period of the Morean War. Extremely cold, wet
winters coupled with repeated severe summer droughts throughout the period of the war
undoubtedly damaged agriculture in the region, as evidenced in numerous palynological
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studies. In turn this placed considerable stress local populaces, compounding upon the
effects of warfare in the area. But did climate change also exacerbate the epidemic
spread of disease? Did heavy winter rains and spring run-offs expand colonies of
malarial mosquitos? Did severe droughts push rodent populations, a known plague
reservoir, from their normal habitats towards human populations and the networks they
operated on? The following chapters will address these specific questions in the temporal
context of the Morean War.

49

CHAPTER III - “THE CLIMATE OF THE EAST” :MALARIA AND THE MOREAN
WAR
The Great Turkish War and Venice
The Morean War was precipitated by another major confrontation between
Christian powers and the Ottoman Empire in Central Europe, the so-called “Great
Turkish War” (1683-1699). In the summer of 1683 Kara Mustafa Pasha, Grand Vizier of
Sultan Mehmet IV, besieged Vienna with a force in excess of 150,000 men, threatening
much of central Europe and the integrity of both the Holy Roman Empire and the
Kingdom of Poland. After a protracted siege, a coalition army of Christian powers, led
by Jan III Sobieski of Poland, moved to relieve the city, and on September 12th, 1683,
inflicted a stinging defeat on the Ottomans before the walls of Vienna. The stunning
Christian victory at Vienna began a series of Ottoman defeats in the Balkan peninsula.
Christian contemporaries viewed the dramatic victory against overwhelming odds as a
sign of divine favor against the infidel Turks. Pope Innocent XI, buoyed by the Christian
victory, encouraged the Venetians to join the Poles and the Empire in a new Holy
League, in hope that a Venetian campaign in Ottoman Greece would divert Turkish
troops away from the main theater of war in the upper Danube basin (Setton, 1991).
Conversely, with the bulk of Ottoman forces engaged further to the north, the time
seemed ripe for Venice to reconquer its lost possessions in the Ionian and Aegean Seas.
After a vigorous debate in the Venetian Senate (Garzoni 1707, 45-51), the
Republic joined the Holy League in March 1684, and immediately set about preparing for
war. The Senate elected Francesco Morosini, a veteran commander during the War of
Candia, as Captain-General. Morosini set sail from Venice on June 10th, gathering
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further ships, troops and supplies from the various Adriatic ports of the Stato da Mar as
his fleet passed by. By June 24th, the fleet anchored at Corfu, where Morosini
rendezvoused with allied naval forces contributed by the Papacy and the Knights of
Malta (Locatelli 1691, I:13-16). The decision was taken to fully secure Venetian control
of the Ionian Sea by seizing Lefkada and the mainland ports of Preveza and Vontisa on
the Gulf of Arta. Both the Lefkada lagoon and the nearby Gulf were important
anchorages in the region, and Turkish pirates were known to sortie from these bases in
their strikes against Christian shipping (Setton 1991, 252; Locatelli 1691, I:65). Morosini
wished to avoid leaving hostile forces along his main supply lines, and he had reason to
believe that the Christian populace of the region was prepared to revolt and support his
campaign. The fortress of Santa Maura, guarding the channel leading into the Lefkada
lagoon, was chosen as the first target in July 1684 (Locatelli 1681, I: 25). After a twoweek siege, the garrison surrendered on August 6th, and subsequently many Greek
chieftains nearby on the mainland rebelled against their Turkish overlords. With the aid
of these local irregulars Morosini moved to besiege Preveza and Vontisa, which both
capitulated by the end of September (Locatelli 1691, I: 59-69). In short order, Christian
forces secured several strategic ports which could act as bases for further operations. As
well, each of these conquests returned long-lost possessions to the Stato da Mar,
satisfying the revanchist fervor driving the Venetian campaign. All in all, the Morean
War was off to a good start for Venice and its Christian allies.
Yet disease was already taking its toll on Morosini’s force. Shortly after the
arrival of the fleet at Corfu in early July 1684, Locatelli reports that over 700 soldiers fell
sick from “that disease ordinary to the Climate of the East”, and he specifically notes that
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it was the “new Levy”, previously unexposed to this “climate” that took ill. Of the 700
sick, they were “doubly decimated through death” (doppiamente decimati), meaning that
they suffered a 20% mortality rate, or approximately 140 deaths (Locatelli 1691, I:28-29;
Garzoni 1707, 66). The siege of S. Maura saw 127 Christians killed in action, but more
than 1,700 soldiers and sailors fell sick and were sent to Corfu for recuperation (Pinzelli
2020, 74). Several weeks later, during the siege of Preveza, oarsmen on the Papal galleys
were struck by the same malady, with over 400 stricken and 60 dying (Locatelli 1691,
I:67). While common soldiers and sailors made up the bulk of the sick, the officer corps
was not immune. The veteran Sergeant-Major Niccolo Bentio and Colonel Pietro
Gabbrielli succumbed in October 1684, followed by Colonel Gio. Battista Sopini
Bergamesco in early November (Locatelli 1691, I:85-89; Garzoni 1707, 66). Conte di
Strassolo, overall commander of Christian ground forces, took ill at Preveza in October,
and along with many other sick soldiers was sent to Corfu to convalesce from the
“mutation of the air”. His illness, like that of many others, lingered for months, and he
died on 8 January 1685 (Locatelli 1691, I:93; Garzoni 1707. 89).
What was this illness endemic to the “Climate of the East”? Identifying the
specific pathogen behind pre-modern epidemics is fraught with difficulty, as our principal
data often consists solely of written accounts of eyewitnesses. Given their relative lack
of epidemiological knowledge and scientific methodology, pre-modern descriptions can
be vague and filled with obvious errors and mistaken assumptions, at least to the modern
scientific eye. Glaring errors, such as blaming diseases on miasmas and vapors
emanating from swamps, often lead scholars to erroneously discount written accounts
entirely (Cunha 2004, 30; Aberth 2021, 237-49). The condescending assumption is often
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that ancient ignorance on some matters renders all such accounts useless as evidence. Yet
the advent of genomic DNA sequencing of ancient remains shows that, most often, premodern descriptions align closely to modern scientific conclusions. This type of genomic
testing has confirmed that the Black Death was, indeed, bubonic plague, and that the
“Plague of Athens” described by Thucydides was typhoid (Aberth 2021, 237;
Papagrigorakis et. al. 2006, 210). The present study asserts that, despite some distortions
stemming from a lack of medical science, our sources are thoroughly capable of
describing the main symptoms and course of the diseases they encountered, and in turn
can provide a relatively accurate taxonomy of disease. In short, we can discern what
diseases impacted ancient peoples from these descriptions, at least in most cases.
Malaria: Epidemiology, Immunity, and Environment
Locatelli’s reference to the “Climate of the East” (Clima di Levante) is
undoubtably malaria. Malaria refers to a class of infectious, vector-borne protozoa of the
genus Plasmodium. Thousands of distinct species exist within the larger genus, but only 4
species are known to infect humans: P. falciparum, P. malariae, P. ovale and P. vivax.
Female mosquitos of the genus Anopheles serve as the disease vector, transmitting
sporozoites through their blood meal into an inoculated host. Once in the human blood
stream, the sporozoites infect the liver, quickly establishing themselves in hepatocyte
cells and spreading back into the blood stream, where they feed off hemoglobin within
red bloods cells as trophozoites, further circulating throughout the host. This rapid spread
(within 48 hours of infection) triggers the body’s immune response, resulting in the
fevers that characterize all malarial species (WHO 2015, CDC 2021). The cyclical
nature of high fever followed by chills is a result of periodic growth and release of
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successive waves of trophozoites into the blood stream, creating distinguishable patterns
of tertian fevers (peaking every 48 hours) or quartan fevers (peaking every 72 hours),
according to the individual malarial species. In the case of P. vivax and P. ovale
sporozoites may become hypnozoites, clusters of dormant plasmodia that can cause
recurring symptoms for months or years after the initial infection (Carter and Mendis
2002, 566). Further symptoms include body aches, vomiting and diarrhea, and severe
anemia caused by the destruction of red blood cells can produce a jaundiced skin-tone.
P. falciparum and P. vivax are the principal cause of mortality in malarial infections, both
resulting in high tertian fever-cycles which, in turn, can lead to cerebral syndrome, coma,
and death (Baird 2013, 48). Common comorbidities include lingering upper respiratory
infections and repeated bouts of diarrhea, and malarial anemia often becomes chronic.
Each of these comorbidities further exacerbates the overall mortality rate over the course
of many months after the initial infection (Etiabe et. al. 2015, 25; Papaioannou et. al.,
2019a).
Repeated malarial infections can produce varying levels of immunity. As an
example, one or two inoculations of P. falciparum is often sufficient to immunize against
life-threatening onset of future infections, and repeated inoculations may eliminate
symptoms entirely (Carter and Mendis 2002, 566). Yet such immunity is specific to the
individual species of plasmodia; immunity to P. vivax does not confer any immunity to P.
ovale, for example (Carter and Mendis 2002, 567). Furthermore, the rapid reproduction
of sporozoite cells within each host results in the speedy mutation of individual strains,
meaning that immunity to one strain of P. falciparum found a specific location may not
confer any protection against a strain of P. falciparum found in a different locale
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(Sallares 2002, 37). The lack of exposure to malarial infection results in a high disparity
in morbidity and mortality between immune/non-immune populations, as evidenced by
the high proportion of children (age 0-5) dying in regions of endemic malaria today, as
opposed to older populations who are largely immune from severe symptoms. Historic
data clearly shows that non-immune travelers into a region of endemic malaria, especially
areas where P. falciparum or P. vivax dominate, suffer exceedingly high mortality rates,
ranging anywhere from 10% to 50% (Alles, Mendis and Carter 1998, 371). French
soldiers stationed in North Africa in the early 19th century consistently exhibited a 30%
mortality rate prior to widespread use of high dose quinine regimes (Sallares 2002, 35).
This wide range of non-immune mortality rates is a consequence of disparate local
conditions, including variations in malarial species or strain, as well as the density of
local Anopheles populations. The issue of immunity is a critical issue in understanding
the impact of malaria on the Morean War, as a large portion of the Christian combatants
originated from regions with little or no malarial exposure, and they were frequently
moved from one combat zone to another, increasing the likelihood of encountering
multiple different strains.
Risk of malarial infection is directly tied to its host vector, the Anopheles
mosquito, and the environments in which these species thrive. Malaria in Greece,
whether P. falciparum or P. vivax, is primarily spread by Anopheles sacharovi, a highly
adaptable species with a proclivity for anthropophilic feeding. A. sacharovi may breed in
any gathering of stagnant water, including brackish waters up to 20% salinity, and warm
waters up to 38-40o C. They tend to feed in early evening hours, and rest either indoors
or in other sheltered areas, including caves, under overhangs, pits, or in heavy
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shrubbery/forestation (Sinka et. al. 2010). In the Mediterranean, A. sacharovi concentrate
in coastal salt marshes and lowland plains, and while it can be found at elevations up to
1100m, it overwhelmingly prefers wetter, low-lying regions (Hanafi-Boyd et. al. 2019,
10). Mosquitos are generally weak flyers and highly susceptible to any wind action, so
local disparities in infection rates between marshy lowlands and adjacent hilly areas is a
demonstrable correlation, apparent in written sources from antiquity onward (Sallares
2002, 57-60). Additionally, malarial infections display a seasonal character, based upon
the life cycle of A. sacharovi. The deadliest infections, mostly associated with P.
falciparum and A. sacharovi, break out in late July and continue through August and
September. Since malaria does not kill quickly, mortality rates tend to lag, with deaths
attributable to the disease spiking as late as October and November (Sallares 2002, 62).
Mosquitos, and the diseases they carry, are also highly sensitive to changes in
climate. Numerous studies from sub-Saharan Africa show a boost in mosquito
populations and attending malarial infections 6-8 weeks following major rain events
during warmer periods, as heavier precipitation increases the number of wetland breeding
sites for mosquito larvae (Diouf et. al. 2020; Githeko et. al. 2000). At the other extreme,
drought conditions also appear to correlate to higher malarial risk. Droughts reduce the
number of predators feeding on mosquito colonies, and the reduction of moving bodies of
water into smaller, stagnant pools creates many more suitable breeding grounds and
intensifies larval production in those locales (Paul et. al. 2017; Kvit 2017). Drought
conditions also increase anthropophilic feeding by various mosquito species, as they
become dehydrated and must feed more frequently to compensate, resulting in increased
infection rates in immediate populations (Hagan et. al. 2018).
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P. falciparum and P. vivax spread into the Mediterranean world as early as the 5th
century B.C. and became endemic to all of Southern Europe in short order (Sallares,
Bouwman and Anderung 2004). The Ionian Islands, the Gulf of Arta, and any lowland
region (below 500m) were known reservoirs of endemic malaria down to the official
eradication of the disease in 1974 (Retief and Cilliers 2004, 130; Kousoulis et. Al. 2015;
Browning 2021). In recent decades small outbreaks of P. vivax have reappeared in
previously endemic regions of Greece, a result of climate change and the increased
mobility of migrant populations in the Mediterranean (Kousoulis et. Al., 2012; Sudre et.
Al., 2013, 784). Endemic malaria is repeatedly noted in the accounts of 19th century
explorers, geographers, and medical personnel. The French physician and diplomat,
Ferdinand Pouqueville, passed through the Morea as a prisoner of the Turks in 17991800, and he describes the Argolid valley as filled with “quartan fevers”, and the
jaundiced complexion of the local populace, a sign of repeated bouts of malaria
(Pouqueville 1806, 73). At the same time, French troops garrisoning Corfu and nearby
Butrint suffered repeated malarial attacks (Hernandez 2019, 393-95). The British
explorer W.M. Leake, traveling in 1805, noted the fertile, yet largely empty, marshy
lowlands of Elis in the northwestern Peloponnese, and largely ascribed their desolate
nature to the “unhealthy air”, or malarial capacity, of the region (Leake 1830, I:1-3).
Later in his work, Leake repeatedly advises that travelers should not risk visiting any of
the Morean lowlands in the summer months, specifically due to the local risk of malaria
(Leake 1830, II:20 & III:171).
The Irish military surgeon John Hennen leaves the most detailed description of
malaria in the Ionian islands. Stationed in British-occupied Corfu in 1821, Hennen
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keenly observed the correlation of environment and epidemic in his postxhumouslypublished work, Sketches of the Medical Topography of the Mediterranean (1830).
Hennen still ascribed to the ancient (and incorrect) miasma theory that pestilential fever
was caused by the “exhalations” of wetlands. While his generation incorrectly identified
the cause of malarial outbreaks, they were correct in the correlation between wetlands
and greater malarial risk. Hennen describes ports, warehouses and barracks located
closer to the port of Corfu, surrounded by marshes, as having a greater incidence of
malaria (145-152). He regarded the fortress of Butrint, surrounded by saltmarsh, as “one
of the most pestiferous mashes in all of Greece”, and the garrison was rotated out of the
fort every two days to lessen the risk of infection (152). At Zakynthos soldiers housed at
the “mole barracks” alongside the port suffered repeated bouts of disease, while those
based in the fortress on the acropolis above remained healthy (335). The same was true of
the local populace; those who lived in the hills avoided contracting malaria until they
came to the lowlands (328). In any case, Hennen regards the Ionian islands as an enzootic
focus of malaria, much like the Greek mainland.
Hennen further distinguishes between types and impact of malarial fevers;
intermittent fevers are divided among quotidian (every 24 hours), tertian (every 48
hours) and quartan (every 72 hours), while the term remittent is used in cases where the
fevers fluctuate in intensity but do not completely subside (219). This follows the
obsolete clinical taxonomy used prior to the mid-20th century, in which the more severe
P. falciparum was usually classified as remittent or as a “malignant” tertiary fever, while
P. vivax and P. ovale were treated as “benign” tertiary fevers. P. malariae was generally
associated with quartan fevers (Baird 2013, 39). These classifications are ambiguous, a

58

consequence of a lack of diagnostic technology. P. vivax, long thought to be less severe
than P. falciparum, has been shown to exhibit remittent fevers in some cases, and has a
fatality profile similar to P. falciparum (Baird 2013, 48-50). Hennen’s own work bears
out these differences. Over seven years (1815-1821) the Corfu garrison suffered 5721
soldiers hospitalized with some form of fever. Of these, 3299 were “common fevers”,
low-level fevers likely associated with any number of ordinary, and generally non-lifethreatening, viral or bacterial infections. The remaining were all the remittent or
intermittent categories, likely associated with some form of malaria. The remittent
category was by far the largest, with 1400 admitted patients, of whom 119 perished, a
mortality rate of 8.5%. On Zakynthos, the highest mortality rate was again found in
remittent fevers, of 7% (Hennen 1830, 335).
Both the historical sources and current scientific evidence agree that malaria,
especially in the form of P. falciparum known to dominate the Greek landscape,
possesses 3 dominate features. First, spatially malarial risk is strongest in wet, lowland
regions, especially those along the coasts, reflecting the principal breeding grounds for
the main vector, A. sacharovi. This coincides with the temporal characteristic; A.
sacharovi tends to breed best in the summer months, from July into October, leading to
greater malarial transmission in those months. Climate change, notably drought
condition, can intensify both the spatial and temporal characteristics of malarial
outbreaks. Finally, the relative immunity of the inoculated human host plays a significant
role in determining morbidity and mortality within a given population. Each of these
features will play a major role in the epidemic outbreak of malaria among Christian
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forces engaged in the Morean War and the subsequent high mortality rate among infected
troops.
GIS Modeling of Malarial Risk in Greece
The spatial distribution of malaria in Greece is well attested in early modern
sources, yet they can only supply general impressions; current GIS modeling bears out
these accounts and allows us to actively quantify and visualize malarial risk. A recent
study by Daniel Browning produced a validated model of malarial risk for several regions
of the Mediterranean world. The model combines rescaled risk layers representing
elevation, temperature, slope, precipitation, and wetness data, all to create a cumulative
risk layer displaying malarial risk on a scale of 0 (low) to 3 (high) (Browning 2021a, 7173). The resulting risk map was validated using the Torelli map of Italian malarial zones
(Torelli 1882; Browning 2021a, 71). Browning has expanded his model to include all of
Greece and provided the model to this author (Browning 2021b). This model is presented
here overlaid with the major malaria outbreaks of the Morean War (Map 6).
This model confirms much of what the historical sources say; malaria risk
prevails in coastal lowlands, which combine the wetness of coastal marshes and alluvial
plains with hot summer temperatures, an ideal breeding ground for A. sacharovi. As
noted in Map 6, this kind of coastal malarial risk coincides with the main ports of the
Ionian Sea and the Peloponnese, critical nodes in the very maritime network being
contested during the Morean War. Venetian forces moving along the network repeatedly
entered landscapes of endemic malarial risk and waged successive, long sieges in these
high-risk zones. The temporal element of these sieges further heightened this risk, as
they all occurred between July and October each succeeding year of the conflict. These
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hot, dry months were prime for military action, yet they correlate to the period of highest
A. sacharovi propagation. The drought conditions prevalent in the Greece in the 1680s
likely intensified mosquito populations and their propensity for anthropophilic feeding,
heightening the overall hazard. So Venetian forces settled into sieges in the highest risk
landscapes at the highest risk time of year for malarial infection. Furthermore, a
substantial proportion of the soldiers brought to the Morea by the Venetians were new to
the region and lacking any natural immunity to local malarial strains, making the army
uniquely vulnerable to malarial infection on a wide scale. The Morean War provided the
perfect combination of spatial, temporal, and human factors to inflict repeated malarial
epidemics on the Venetians and their allied forces.
This deadly combination of factors reveals itself from the outset of the war in
1684. The Venetian base at Corfu sits within a “red zone” of malarial risk, as noted both
by the Malarial Risk Model (Map 6) and by the Hennen’s work in the 1820s (Hennen
1830). It is unsurprising that the “new levy” sickened upon their arrival in July 1864 and
that the mortality rate rose to approximately 20%. Subsequent attacks on S. Maura,
Preveza, and Vonitza in August and September 1684 similarly exposed the Venetian fleet
to high-risk malarial spaces. These portscontrolled access to the Gulf of Arta, the largest
anchorage on the Ionian Sea. The Gulf was ringed with extensive saltmarshes and was
known for its miasmic fevers, so a high infection rate with a significant number of
mortality events is to be expected. Yet these early malarial outbreaks pale in comparison
to the mass-mortality events that would strike Venetian-led armies in subsequent years.
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Map 6. Malarial Risk Analysis for Greece with known Malarial outbreaks, 1684-1688. Risk analysis layer
courtesy Daniel C. Browning, Jr. (2021).
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Mercenaries and Malaria in the Peloponnese, 1685-86.
In June 1685 the first of 2400 Hanoverian musketeers arrived in theater at an
advanced base at Dragomestre, along the Epirote coast. This would be the first of several
waves of Hanoverian, Hessian and Saxon infantry hired by the Venetian Senate and
brought from their homes in Northern Germany to supplement the Republic’s forces.
This need for mercenaries was fueled by both quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in
the Venetian military. As a maritime power Venice projected its power on the high seas,
and possessed only limited infantry reserves as a consequence. The Republic’s ground
forces largely consisted of Schiavoni, Slavic irregulars drawn from Istria and Dalmatia,
and some Greeks from the Ionian islands. In order to wage a land campaign in Greece
the Republic needed many more infantry capable of conducting sieges and engaging large
Ottoman field armies (Setton 1991, 292). The German mercenaries they procured were
among the best trained and equipped forces in Europe at the time. The Hanoverian forces
arriving at Dragomestre consisted solely of musket-armed infantry; they abandoned
pikemen in favor of the socket bayonet for defense against Turkish cavalry, one of the
first militaries in Europe to make this pivotal shift (Black 1994, 39).
The ethnographic make-up of the mercenary forces deployed to Greece is a
critical factor in understanding the role of malaria during the Morean War. While highly
capable soldiers, these northern Germans possessed no acquired immunity to any species
or strain of malaria. The forces used in the 1684 campaign in the Gulf of Arta largely
consisted of Italian, Southern Slavic, and other inhabitants of Mediterranean climates,
and only a minority were previously unexposed to the “climate of the East” noted by
Locatelli. Conversely, the German mercenaries brought to Greece from 1685 onward
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were overwhelmingly vulnerable, meaning that any outbreak among them would swiftly
reach epidemic proportions and inflict a high mortality rate. High hospitalization rates
and death tolls among the ranks of elite, professional soldiers not only created a
manpower shortage but a diminished the overall quality of the army, requiring the further
recruitment of more mercenary regiments from Germany. In turn, new German recruits
exhibited the same epidemiological vulnerabilities as the soldiers they replaced. These
factors created a recurring loop of recruitment, infection, epidemic, mortality, and new
recruitment to make up losses.
The Siege of Koroni
The muster of Christian forces at Dragomestre in June 1685 saw the Hanoverian
regiments joined by contingents from Florence (300), Dalmatia (1000), the Papal States
(400), the Knights of Malta (1000), along with Venetian infantry (1600) and sailors
(1500) (Schwenke 1854, 24-25). This gave the Captain-General, Francesco Morosini, an
army of 10,000 effectives to use in the 1685 campaign.

The immediate target was the

Messenian peninsula in the southwest Peloponnese, dominated by the ports of Methoni
on the west and Koroni on the east. Before their loss to the Turks in 1500 the two ports
were known as the “eyes of the Republic”, as they dominated the maritime transition
between the Aegean and Ionian Seas (Map 3). The importance of these ports in maritime
networks is reflected in Koroni’s Betweeness Centrality score (.30103), putting it in 10th
place out of 148 nodes in the network (Table 2). After sailing to the island of Sapienza
off Methoni, Morosini and his officers decided to attack Koroni first. The immediate
concern was supporting local Greek rebels in the Mani peninsula opposite Koroni, as well
as isolating the rest of the Messenian peninsula from Ottoman reinforcements. By June
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25th infantry disembarked under the walls of Koroni and commenced building siegeworks
(Locatelli 1691, I: 125; Andrews 2006, 11).
The struggle for Koroni was a classic early modern siege. Sitting on a headland
jutting out into the sea, the Christian army cut off Koroni with a circumvallation trench
across the neck of the promontory, and proceeded to build zig-zagged assault trenches
snaking towards the walls. A Turkish relief force arrived on July 7th, forcing Morosini to
order the construction of countervailing fortifications facing outward towards the Turkish
camp, and the siege devolved into a series of sorties and counter-sorties against the
opposing trenches. At dawn on August 7th Morosini launched a surprise attack on the
Ottoman camp, routing the Turks and seizing their supplies. The Turkish defeat gave
Venetian engineers the respite they needed to complete a mine under the fortress walls,
and on August 11th, a breach was blown open in the city defenses. Despite a Turkish
attempt to surrender, Christian forces assaulted Koroni and sacked the city, leaving 1500
dead from among the garrison and the populace (Andrews 2006, 12-13). The dead were
subsequently tossed into the sea (Locatelli 1691, I:151). Turkish forces continued
attempts to dislodge the Christian forces from the region, but a set-piece battle at
Kalamata on September 14th resulted in a stinging Ottoman defeat and retreat from the
region. This secured the Christian hold on Koroni and allowed Greek rebels in the
nearby Mani peninsula to eject local Turkish garrisons (Pinzelli 2020, 93).
Despite the very real violence of these clashes, disease proved a much greater
danger than Turkish artillery or musketry. By July 16th the Hanoverian regiments
reported an epidemic beginning in their ranks, with 60 sick with fever and dysentery. Of
these, 19 (30%) died within weeks (Schwenke 1854, 32). By August 3rd, more than 400
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were sick, with 150 dead, and more than 1000 were ill by August 11th (Schwenke 1854,
42). In late August, Locatelli describes a “grave malady” afflicting the officer corps, and
by September 17th the “very dangerous illness” striking the force required extra medical
staff to be called from the Ionian islands (Locatelli 1691, I: 158, 167). Just as in the
previous summer, many of the sick were removed from the combat theater and sent to
convalesce in hospital at Zakynthos, though mortality continued at a high rate. Of the
772 Hanoverian sent to Zakynthos in late September, 193 (33%) died by October 10th and
some level of mortality continued among them through the fall and early winter.
Hanoverian records from January 10th, 1686 show that, of the 2400 mercenaries on hand
for the 1685 campaign, 992 had perished. Of these, 256 fell in combat, while 736
succumbed to illness (Schwenke 1854, 58). This places the overall mortality rate at 39%,
with disease mortality at 31%.
Determining the mechanism behind the epidemic at Koroni poses some
difficulties. The contemporary sources only provide a single vague reference to specific
symptoms, high fever, and dysentery (Schwenke 1854, 32), which are common indicators
of several diseases, including P. falciparum as well as typhoid fever (S. typhi), a
bacterium in the Salmonella family. In fact, due to this overlap in symptoms it can be
difficult to properly diagnose malaria from typhoid, even for modern medical
practitioners (Cunha 2005). And typhoid is a real possibility in context of the Morean
War. Typhoid is water borne, spreading via human fecal matter into contaminated food
and drinking water, and is a known danger in densely populated, unsanitary conditions
(Amicizia et. al. 2019, 271), such as siege camps like that at Koroni. Furthermore,
typhoid is known to have been present in Greece as early as the Peloponnesian War of the
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5th century BC. Recent aDNA evidence demonstrates that the “Plague of Athens”
described by Thucydides in 430 BCE was indeed typhoid (Papagrigorkoris 2006).
However, given the limited nature of our evidence, as well as what we know
about malarial risk in Greece, malaria is still the most likely culprit behind the high
mortality at Koroni. First, Koroni sits firmly in the highest risk category of the Malarial
Risk Analysis (Map 6). The local geography and climate are at high risk for A.
sacharovi populations, and the LIA-induced drought conditions present in 1685 (Map
4b) further heightened that risk. The timing of the epidemic, beginning in July and
continuing into September and October, directly correlates to the period of prime A.
sacharovi reproduction. Indeed, the siege of Koroni took place at the worst time of year,
in one of the worst places, for malarial risk. Finally, the rate of morbidity and mortality
among the Hanoverian is exactly what we would expect from a non-immune population
being exposed to a malarial environment. Considered together the evidence points to
malaria as the major killer at Koroni.
The campaign of 1686: Pylos, Methoni and Nauplion.
The winter of 1685-86 allowed Morosini to rest and recuperate his remaining
forces, while the Venetian Senate hired more mercenaries from Germany to make up the
loses from the previous season. The reinforcements included additional Hanoverian
mercenaries to replace loses in the original three regiments, as well as add a fourth
regiment of musketeers commanded by the Raugraf zu Pfalz. Some 1500 Saxon infantry
were recruited as well, and other members of the Holy League contributed larger
contingents. New recruitment produced in a substantially larger force for the 1686
campaign, allowing a muster of 10,800 combat troops on Zakynthos at the end of May
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1686 (Schwenke 1854, 72). A new ground commander also arrived in theater, the
experienced Swedish general Otto Wilhelm von Königsmarck, accompanied by his wife
Charlotta and her retinue. The Königsmarck household included Charlotta’s close friend,
Anna Akerhjelm, whose letters and diary comprise one of the major eyewitness resources
for the subsequent campaigns (Akerhjelm 1854).
Morosini’s proximate goal was to secure the western Messenian peninsula. On
June 2, 1686, Königsmarck’s troops landed below Old Navarino, the medieval fortress
guarding the northern entrance to Navarino Bay. The small, ill-equipped garrison
surrendered the next day when their water supply was cut by the besieging forces, and in
return they were allowed to sail to Alexandria with their families (Locatelli 1691, I:212).
A siege of the much stronger fortress at New Navarino (modern Pylos) commenced
immediately, and after Königsmarck routed a relief force and Christian artillery ignited
the fortress’s gunpowder store, the remaining Turks capitulated on June 14th. As at Old
Navarino, the surviving Turks evacuated to Tripoli in North Africa (Locatelli 1691,
I:211-212). These successes left all of Navarino Bay in Christian hands.
Methoni was the only remaining Turkish strongpoint on the Messenian peninsula.
The Christian siege began on June 22nd, and the Turkish commander refused several of
Morosini’s calls to surrender. He was encouraged to resist by Methoni’s strong
fortifications and the presence of major relief force in the region. Turkish cavalry raided
through much of the countryside, hoping to entice Venetian forces out of their siege camp
for a battle in the open field (Locatelli 1691, I:232). That strategy, while devastating to
the local countryside, failed to distract Morosini and Königsmarck, and the Turkish
garrison surrendered on July 7th, and the 4000 Turks within followed those of Navarino to
68

Libya (Locatelli 1691, I:236). With both Methoni and Koroni returned to their dominion,
Venice had regained strategic control of the juncture of the Ionian and Aegean Seas.
The capitulation of three fortresses in quick succession meant relatively few
combat losses for the Christian army. Yet disease continued to take a toll, especially
among the new recruits. By June 16th, 584 Hanoverian soldiers had fallen ill, out of 3219
total effectives, with 45 dying as a result. Of these, 267, including 24 of the dead,
belonged to the newly arrived “Raugraf” Regiment, meaning that 45% of the sick soldiers
had no previous contact with malaria, and thus no possible immunity (Schwenke 1854,
83). This one regiment suffered twice the rate of illness as the other three regiments,
which were mostly made up of veterans of the previous campaign. The mortality rate as
of June 16th remained low compared to the previous year, at 7% overall, and 8.9% in the
“Raugraf” Regiment. However, the lower mortality rate may be explained by the
presence of a less severe malarial species in the region of Methoni, such as P. vivax, or by
the relatively short window of infection to date. The report of June 16th was just under 3
weeks into the campaign, and malarial deaths tend to lag weeks or months behind initial
infection. Regardless, this particular outbreak did not significantly hamper military
operations.
The presence of an energetic new ground commander, the swift successes in
Messenia, and the relatively few loses suffered thus far, all encouraged Morosini to act
boldly. In late July 1686 Morosini sailed with a large force to attack Nauplion, the
capital of the Ottoman Morea and gateway to the fertile Argolid valley. Königsmarck and
his ground forces landed at nearby Port Tolon, and within hours seized the Palamidi hill
overlooking Nauplion. Gun batteries on the heights began the bombardment of the city,
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while the main Christian army encamped on the plain below and began digging mines
and assault trenches (Andrews 2006, 90). Ismail Pasha, the Ottoman governor of the
Morea, moved quickly to relieve Nauplion with a force of 7000 cavalry and infantry.
Königsmarck countered this move aggressively, confronting the Ottoman force on the
plains below Argos on August 7th, and after a sharp clash forced the Turks to retreat.
Ottoman cavalry continued attacks against the Christian camp for the next several weeks,
while the garrison of Nauplion sortied against the encroaching siegeworks frequently
(Locatelli 1691, I:247). Ismail Pasha attempted a surprise nighttime attack on the
Christian camp on August 27th, but being forewarned by the local Greek populace,
Königsmarck met the assault with his full army, killing 1400 Turks in return for only 300
Christian dead and wounded (Pinzelli 2020, 117). Nauplion surrendered on August 29th,
and the 9000 Turkish residents took ship to the Ottoman-held Island of Tenedos
(Locatelli 1691, I:269). The capture of Nauplion concluded an exceptional campaigning
season for the Venetians and their allies, with four major fortresses falling in under three
months, and with few combat losses, even against significant Turkish opposition.
Yet again, as noted by a contemporary historian, disease “killed more than the
scimitars of the Turks” (Beregnani 1698, II:89). As at Methoni the previous year, the
siege of Nauplion took place in a high-risk malarial zone (Map 6) at the very time of year
of peak mosquito breeding. The Argolid valley is one of the largest agricultural plains in
the Peloponnese, with numerous watercourses flowing through the valley and into the
Argolic Gulf. As noted above (p. 61), malaria was a known risk in the Argolid, as directly
observed by European travelers, and the local Greek populace bore the telltale jaundiced
complexion of survivors of repeated malarial infections. Furthermore, the summer of
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1686 saw more intense drought conditions in Greece than the previous year (Map 4c),
further heightening the risk of infection within the valley. Garzoni specifically notes the
hot, dry weather at Nauplion as an anecdotal factor in the spread of the epidemic
(Garzoni 1707, 100).
Just as the battle for Nauplion reached its final phase at the end of August 1686, a
malarial epidemic wreaked havoc among the Christian army. A muster of the
Hanoverian regiments just before the battle of August 27th showed only 1551 soldiers fit
for duty; the remaining 1200 were listed as sick and wounded, or 43% of the entire force
(Schwenke 1854, 112). Zorzi Emo, commissary officer for the entire army, reported 178
deaths by disease throughout the force the last week of August. The situation vastly
worsened in the first half of September, with 4018 sick and 1073 dead, meaning more
that 50% of the army had been infected, with a mortality rate of 21%. (Pinzelli 2020,
345).
The officer corps suffered as much as the rank-and-file. Barbaro Brigadino,
commander of the Condennati Regiment, died on August 25th, along with the nobleman
Bernardo Visconti, followed on the 28th by Girolamo Ghirardi and Francesco Loredan
(Locatelli I: 265-6). Stefano Gregorovich and Giovanni Bernardo Topau, both infantry
officers, succumbed in mid-September (Locatelli 1691:276). In all Locatelli lists 9
Venetian officers who died in the fall of 1686 from this epidemic. Many others grew ill
and recovered; Daniel Dolfin, commander of one of the naval flotillas, became gravely ill
for several weeks, while Lorenzo Venier is reported to have been “resurrected from his
illness”. The Captain-General’s own brother, Lorenzo Morosini, died after long illness on
December 31st (Locatelli 1691, I:271).
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Königsmarck’s household was especially hard-hit, as noted in the letters and diary
of Anna Akerhjelm. His 27 year-old nephew, Karl Johann von Königsmarck, died on
August 27th after experiencing a “fiery fever” (Akerhjelm 1854, 227). Over the next
several weeks much of the household fell ill, including Count Königsmarck and his wife
Charlotta, who were attended by a surgeon from one of the Saxon regiments. They both
suffered fevers from September 18th to October 6th, according to Akerhjelm’s diary,
before recovering, as did several maids (Akerhjelm 1854, 257-259). Many others were
not so fortunate. Three members of Karl Johann’s retinue died shortly after him, as well
as several staff officers, valets, and the Count’s baker and confectioner (Akerhjelm 1854,
227-229). As expected, illness and deaths continued to lag well behind the period of
initial infection, a result of various comorbidities attendant to malaria. Several of
Akerhjelm’s fellow ladies-in-waiting remained sick into December, exhibiting tertian
fevers in several cases (Akerhjelm 1854, 231) Much of the army, including all of the sick,
embarked for winter quarters and convalescence at Zakynthos at the end of October. Due
to ill winds and heavy rains the trip took 6 weeks, not arriving at Zakynthos until
December 15th. In the interim, 90 more Hanoverian soldiers died, as well as Herr
Fabricius, Königsmarck’s Lutheran chaplain (Schwenke 1854, 124; Akerhjelm 1854,
259).
From a military standpoint the 1686 campaign was stunningly successful.
Morosini and Königsmarck pursued an aggressive strategy, besieging multiple wellfortified, supplied, and garrisoned strongpoints, all while mobile Turkish armies
constantly threatened their siege lines. In each case the Christian army routed relief
forces and forced the capitulation of the besieged garrison, all with very few combat
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casualties. These successes testify to the able leadership of commanders like
Königsmarck, as well as the tactical skill of the highly trained German mercenaries they
led. But the environment proved a much greater challenge to the Christian forces,
especially at Nauplion. The German infantry from Hanover and Saxony, especially those
new to the theater, lacked any natural immunity to malarial infection. Even those
Hanoverian veterans of the previous summer, as well as the rest of the army, possessed
no immunity from any malarial strain specific the Argolid plain. Heavy drought, evident
in the dendrochronology of the region, exacerbated the already high malarial risk of the
region, all at the worst time of year for mosquito propagation. The toll is best illustrated
by the muster records of the Hanoverian regiments; of the 3219 soldiers and 150 servants
present at Zakynthos on May 23rd, only 2058 remained at the end of December 1686,
with a loss of 1300 soldiers/servants and 58 officers (Schwenke 1854, 124).
Unfortunately for the survivors, the new year and new campaign season held a different
epidemic in store.
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CHAPTER IV – PLAGUE AND THE PARTHENON: BUBONIC PLAGUE IN THE
MOREA, 1687-1688
Winter quarters provided Morosini and Königsmarck the opportunity to
convalesce the survivors of the previous year, recruit and marshal new forces, and plan
their next strategic moves. As well, they were concerned with countering frequent
Turkish cavalry raids into Venetian-held areas of the Morea, which burned local villages
and forcibly evacuated many Greeks from the Morea into Turkish controlled regions of
Greece, a kind of ethnic cleansing (Locatelli 1691, I: 297; Beregnani 1698, 256).
Whatever the commanders initially planned, they were upended by the appearance of
bubonic plague in the Morea and the wider Aegean in Spring 1687. Local Greek
chieftains warned Morosini that the plague recurred in the Morea every 10 years, and that
they were due for a return visit from the disease (Locatelli 1691, I:300). In March 1687,
the plague appeared within the Venetian fleet, as diagnosed by Venetian medical
personnel. The Protomedicus Draga, chief medical officer of the Venetian contingent,
examined several infected individuals and described symptoms, including “buboes of the
groin” which “make the sick die quickly and make the healthy sick” (Locatelli 1691, I:
301). Draga immediately submitted his findings to Morosini, who dispatched the report
directly to Venice. The war effort took a decidedly new turn with the arrival of this
deadly contagion.
Morosini and his medical staff had every reason to fear the appearance of plague,
as the Venetians had long experience with it. Like so many other major European trade
centers, Venice suffered from repeated recurrences of plague, in 1478, 1528 and 1555.
Prolonged epidemics struck in 1575-77 and again in 1630-1631, and each of these events
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killed as many as 50,000 Venetians out of a populace of 160,000 to 190,000, which
amounted to one quarter to one third of the citizenry (Martin 2022, 6; Setton 1991, 105).
As a consequence, the Republic developed an extensive heath system, the Magistrato alla
Sanità, empowered by the Senate with a full raft of health laws, to conduct disease
surveillance throughout the Stato da Mar, enact quarantine procedures, and manage
lazarettos at Venice and other Venetian-held ports. The Venetian Senate also patronized
the medical profession, subsidizing the premier medical school at nearby Padua and
engaging the services of the best medical personnel in Europe. These medical humanists,
such as Girolamo Mercuriale, produced numerous treatises on the causes and treatment of
plague (Mercuriale 2022). The Venetian health establishment was confident enough in
its knowledge of plague that during the War of Candia (1644-1669), they unsuccessfully
attempted to weaponize a “quintessence of the plague” to infect Turkish forces deployed
in Crete (Thassalinou et. al. 2015, 2149).
Bubonic Plague: Epidemiology, Mortality and Environment
Bubonic plague is a vector-borne, zoonotic disease caused by the bacterium
Yersinia pestis, which is primarily carried and transmitted through various species of
fleas and lice, including Oriental rat flea, Xenopsylla cheopis, and the human flea (Pulex
irritans). In turn, infected flea populations can infest a wide variety of mammalian
species, but rodent species are the most common enzootic plague reservoirs and source of
epizootic transmission into human populations. Infected fleas, especially X. cheopis,
suffer from a blockage of their intestinal tract, resulting in regurgitation of the Y. pestis
bacterium. Regurgitated bacteria are thereby transmitted to an inoculated host when the
flea feeds (Abbot and Rocke 2012, 5). The foregut blockage, which prevents blood meal
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from reaching the insect’s stomach, encourages frequent feeding, as the flea is literally
starving, and thus heightens transmission potential (Aberth 2021, 2-3).
Morbidity and Mortality
Once within a human host, Y. pestis bacteria spread via the lymphatic system, first
infecting lymph nodes closest to the point of inoculation, then spreading to nodes in the
groin and neck. This results in visible buboes, swellings or carbuncles, which
characterize bubonic plague. The infection brings about high fevers, chills, body aches,
and ultimately causes multi-system organ failure and death within 3 to 5 days from the
onset of symptoms. It is common for the bacteria to break into the lungs, creating
pneumonic plague, allowing for human-to-human transmission via sputum. Pneumonic
plague is even more deadly, with death occurring within 2 to 3 days, due to the
respiratory distress it causes. Septicemic plague, an infection of the bloodstream, can kill
even more swiftly, in less than 24 hours, owing to septic shock. The bodily fluids of the
victims of septicemic plague are particularly dangerous to those who handle them.
Overall mortality rates in modern plague events are between 60% and 80% for bubonic
plague, while primary pneumonic or septicemic infections are universally fatal without
immediate antibiotic treatment (Aberth 2021, 6-7).
Y. pestis is the pathogen responsible for all three plague Pandemics; the First
Pandemic (the Justinianic Plague) striking the Mediterranean World and Europe from
541 to 549, with subsequent regional recurrences into the 8th century, the Second
Pandemic (the Black Death) crossing Afro-Eurasia from 1346 to 1353, with frequent
reappearances up to the early 19th century, and the Third Pandemic began in central
China in 1854, spreading globally with outbreaks through the 1920s (Abbot and Roche
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2012, 2; Aberth 2021, 8-9). Though it is difficult to accurately quantify pre-modern
death tolls and mortality rates, each of these pandemics ravaged global populations,
killing millions and often reducing impacted populations by as much as 50%.
Despite numerous historical accounts accurately describing clinical
symptomology and epidemiology of Y. pestis, some scholars have aggressively denied
plague as the causative agent behind these pandemics. Multiple aDNA studies of plague
burials, however, decisively confirm Y. pestis as the causative agent behind all of these
pandemics, to the point that all other possible explanations have been silenced (Little
2012; Sarris 2021). Furthermore, aDNA sequencing has allowed scholars to look back
into the evolutionary history of the plague with incredible precision. Monica Green’s
seminal work on the phylogenetic history of plague shows that both the Second and Third
Pandemic, as well as all current strains of Y. pestis, trace back of an evolutionary “big
bang” event occurring in the 13th century in the Tian Shan Mountains, along the borders
of China, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan (Green 2021, 1611-1614).
Endemic Environments and Transmission via rodents.
Plague transmission is closely tied to the behavior of rodent populations. Endemic
reservoirs/foci of sylvatic plague historically have existed among various rodent colonies
in highland forests and grasslands. Within these colonies, the pathogen circulates at a low
level, allowing the disease to survive without killing off its host population. Identifiable
foci exist today in several places. The Tian Shan mountains of China/Kyrgyzstan and the
Quighan-Tibetan Plateau both support colonies of plague-infested rodents, notably the
native marmot (Marmota baibacina) of the region (Sariyeva et. al. 2019; Qian et. al.
2014). Given that the “big bang” described by Green (2021, 1614) took place in this area,
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finding endemic plague here is unsurprising. The Third Pandemic of the late 19th/early
20th century, spreading via global trade lanes, established plague reservoirs in previously
untouched locales, including the Four Corners region of the American Southwest, the
Ituri rainforest of Congo and Uganda, and the central highlands of Madagascar (Abbot
and Rocke 2012, 16; Eisen et. al. 2007; Lofty 2015; Andrianaivoarimanana 2019).
Despite the global distribution of these plague foci, the geographic commonality between
all of them is the prevalence of elevation (500m – 2300m) and landcover (forest and
grasslands) among the preferred environments for host rodent colonies.
The epizootic leap from endemic disease in a rodent population to an
epidemic/pandemic outbreak among human populations is a consequence of both human
and rodent behavior. Many rodents, especially the Black Rat (Rattus rattus), are
commensal species that establish symbiotic relationships with human communities.
Human societies, through their agricultural output and waste, provide ready sources of
food for rodents, and given the furtive nature of these species the size of their colonies is
often underestimated by several orders of magnitude. In simple terms, human settlements
attract rodent colonies, and these colonies are large (up to 6000 per square mile), whether
they are observable or not (McCormick 2003, 14). R. rattus, as well as many other
rodents, adapt well to new environments and climates, and demonstrate considerable
mobility, travelling along with their human companions by land and sea. The inherent
mobility of rodent species and the fleas they carry, along with their commensal
relationship with human communities, is a critical aspect of the spread of bubonic plague.
As humans move, the rats and their fleas move with them.
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Moreover, rodent populations are just as susceptible to environmental change as
humans. Any change to food supply can cause rodent populations to act in abnormal
ways. The trophic cascade model has been observed in numerous species of rodents,
wherein heavier spring rains result in the growth of more vegetation. Increased food
resources lead to a boom in rodent populations, in turn leading to greater incidence of
plague transmission, as repeatedly observed in the American Southwest (Abbot and
Rocke, 2012, 40-41; Gage et. al. 2007, 443-444). Conversely drought also raises the risk
of epizootic plague; rodents weakened by hunger and/or dehydration often attract twice
the fleas they would normally, a result of their weakened ability to fend off flea
infestations (Eads et. al. 2016). X. cheopis tolerates drought conditions well, being able
to go 100 days without feeding (Gage 2005), so drought does not impede plague
transmission, and likely encourages it. The oscillation between wet winters and droughtridden summers characteristic of the LIA may have created a kind of push-and-pull effect
on rodent/flea populations, in which wet conditions in early spring allowed for a trophic
cascade and a rise in rodent populations, while the summer droughts killed off these
rodents, forcing their fleas to find new host colonies (Schmid et. al. 2015, 3024).
Disruptions to infected rodent colonies, such as those caused by climate shifts,
become amplification events that push rodents/fleas away from their endemic
environments and towards new hosts. This is how Y. pestis jumps from highland plague
reservoirs towards commensal species like R. rattus. Indeed, scholars now suggest that
periodic climate change in the Old World plague reservoirs of Central Asia was the
catalyst for both the First and Second Pandemics. Extreme vulcanism in the 530s and
540s and the colder temperatures that followed likely sparked the First Pandemic, while
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the climate fluctuations of the LIA repeatedly pushed plague outwards from its natural
foci (Harper 2017, 251-255; Schmid et. al. 2015, 3025).
Plague in the Ottoman World, 1346-1841
To understand how bubonic plague impacted the Morean War, we must recognize
how the plague effected the Ottoman Empire at large, especially those landscapes most
closely connected to the Morea. Simply put, the Black Death that entered the Ottoman
world in 1343 never truly ended, but continuously circulated throughout the Empire and
its hinterlands for the next five centuries, reappearing in various locales repeatedly. The
complex maritime and terrestrial networks crossing the Ottoman world, as described in
Chapter II, and the ships, caravans and armies that moved along them, were conduits of
plague transmission. Rather than bringing people into regions of endemic disease, as with
malaria, these networks distributed plague to every corner of the Empire.
Nükhet Varlık identifies three distinct phases of plague movement across the
Ottoman landscape. First, an initial period (1346-1517) occurred in which the lateByzantine and Ottoman world was integrated into a large European network of plague.
Plague flowed into the Ottoman Empire largely from the west, with Venice as a an
especially dangerous plague node in the late-15th century (Varlik 2015, 135-137). The
Ottoman conquest of Mamluk Egypt in 1517, which doubled the size of the Empire,
radically shifted trade networks towards Egypt and the Arabian Sea. The large grain
shipments subsequently coming out of the Nile valley became a new source of plague
transmission to Istanbul and Anatolian ports along the way (Varlik 2015, 167). The final
phase developed after 1570, as the Ottomans reached a kind of imperial maturity. The
growing cities of central Anatolia, like Kayseri and Konya, developed even closer links
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to Istanbul, with most foodstuffs, trade goods and manpower from these regions filtering
towards the imperial metropolis. But just as Istanbul was the center of political and
economic power, drawing all towards it, it was also the center of plague distribution,
drawing plague from various foci within the Empire and beyond, and then pumping Y.
pestis back along the network (Varlik 2015, 174-181). This final phase continued until
the final plague epidemics of the mid-19th century.
Mapping Plague in the Ottoman Heartland
Varlik’s three-phase schema is sensible, but she fails to utilize contemporary GIS
mapping techniques to support her argument. The maps supplied in her work are vague,
using only basic arrows to show routes and direction of plague movements in each of the
larger phases she describes (Varlik 2015, 134, 137, 161, 188). This is only a step beyond
the infamous Carpentier map of the Black Death in Europe, 1347-1350 (Carpentier
1962). This map presents bubonic plague progressing through Europe in wide-spanning
annual waves, looping over Europe from south to north as a slow-moving tsunami of
disease. Diseases do not spread in such a linear fashion. As John Aberth notes, epidemic
disease tends to spread metastatically, jumping over one spot to appear in another place
further away, only to return to those places skipped over at a later time (Aberth 2021, 30).
This better reflects human behavior, as merchants and their accompanying rodents may
pass by one town or port, favoring another place entirely. Varlik’s maps, while
accurately depicting a basic form of plague transmission, still fail to communicate the
complexity of plague in the Ottoman world.
Identifying plague reservoirs within the Ottoman orbit is critical to understanding
plague movements. Some scholars uncritically assert that no plague reservoirs existed
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within Ottoman Anatolia or the Balkans; rather they claim plague emanated out of the
Caucasus and simply progressed through Ottoman trade centers and networks (Schmid et.
al. 2015, 3021; White 2011. 86). Varlik (2015, 105-112) argues for the existence of
plague foci in the Anatolian highlands, particularly the Taurus mountains to the south of
the Anatolian plateau. The highland elevations, forested landcover and the presence of
native rodents (the Anatolian ground squirrel, Spermophilus xanthoprymnus) all indicate
an environment perfect for sustaining reservoirs of plague (Varlik 2015, 105-112). Yet
even Varlik is relying purely on anecdotal evidence, making no attempt to quantify the
likelihood of plague reservoirs in the region.
This study produced an analytical map (Map 7) detailing the environmental
suitability for possible plague foci within Ottoman Anatolia and the Balkans, overlaid
with known plague outbreaks in the region from 1346 to 1841. The Plague Suitability
Model uses criteria drawn from current plague risk modelling in the American Southwest
(Abbot and Rocke 2012, 16; Eisen et. al. 2007), the Tibetan Plateau (Sariyeva et. al.
2019; Qian et. al. 2014), and Madagascar (Andrianaivoarimanana 2019), including
elevation, landcover, and spring/summer average daily temperatures. No such
information is available for the 17th century, so modern data are used as a proxy. Digital
elevation data (DEM) were derived from the 30m EU-DEM v. 1.1 dataset (Copernicus
Land Monitoring Service 2021a) and was reclassified following the risk analysis found in
Gage et. al. (2007), with the highest risk score (5) given to elevations from 1300m to
2300m. Elevation ranges from 500-1300m and 2300-3000m still show significant risk
(4), while elevations below 500m, capable but unlikely to host plague foci, are given a
lower score (2). Elevations above 3000m host few or no rodents, and thus are given the
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lowest score (1). The CORINE Landcover 2018 dataset (Copernicus Land Monitoring
Service 2021b) were reclassified to give the highest scores to forested landscapes (5),
grasslands (4) and agricultural plots (4). Lower scores (0 or 1) were given to wetlands
and urban developments. Spring and summer temperature was added as a criterion, since
flea reproduction is largely governed by warm climates (Abbot and Rocke 2012, 41).
Monthly averaged temperature data for May to September was supplied by the
Copernicus Climate Change Service (2021), and reclassified to reflect optimal flea
populations, with 26°C to 36°C receiving the highest rank (5). Degree ranges above and
below this threshold were ranked lower (0 to 2). The model then weights the reclassified
datasets according to the studies noted above, with elevation multiplied by 2, landcover
by 1.5, and temperature by 1. The sum of the weighted scores produced the final analysis
raster.
In order to compare identifiable plague reservoirs with known plague
occurrences, a dataset was compiled from the major plague studies of the Ottoman
Empire, including Varlik’s work noted above (2015), Daniel Panzac’s La peste dans
l'Empire ottoman, 1700-1850 (1985), and Jacques Biraben’s Les hommes et la peste en
France et dans les pays européens et méditerranéens (1975). Additional data was added
from several more focused studies (Setton 1991; White 2011; Tsiamis et. al. 2011), as
well as new primary source materials used in this study (Locatelli 1691; Laborde 1854).
The dataset resulted in more than 1000 plague events across the Ottoman Balkans and
Anatolia over five centuries. The dataset was then imported into ArcGIS, displayed as
graduated symbols by event count, and overlaid over the Plague Suitability Model,
creating Map 7.
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The results are striking. First, while it is clear that much of the study area scores
high on the Suitability Model scale, the highest scores are clearly in the Taurus
Mountains crossing southern Anatolia. Here, proper elevation combines with a forested
landscape, the perfect breeding ground for local rodent species, the fleas they carried, and
Y. pestis, bearing out the anecdotal evidence cited by Varlik (2015, 105-112). These
high-scoring areas are also located near caravan routes that connect many of the trade
centers of the Empire; this is especially true in Southwestern Anatolia, where caravan
routes feed towards Istanbul to the north, as well as the port of Izmir on the western
coastline. The importance of possible plague foci in southwest Anatolia is further
heightened when LIA induced drought is considered. PDSI data from the Old-World
Drought Atlas, averaged for the 1680-1689 decade, were reclassified on a scale of 8 to 0,
with the positive numbers indicating a negative PDSI score, or drought. The resulting
raster output was multiplied by the Plague Suitability Model to emphasize possible
plague reservoirs most heavily impacted by drought conditions. This may indicate where
rodent colonies, with environments disrupted by drought, dispersed and sought out new,
more hospitable settings, transmitting plague in the process.
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Map 7: Plague Suitability Model in context of known plague events, 1346-1841.
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Table 3: Plague Events by Ottoman City or Region, 1343-1841.
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Map 8: Plague Suitability in context of Little Ice Age droughts.
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Again, southwest Anatolia stands out (Map 8), particularly the mountains of
ancient Pamphylia, between Isparta and Antalya. This area is in close proximity to major
trade routes in central Anatolia that funneled men and material toward Istanbul, as well as
routes directed towards the ports of western Anatolia. This suitability model
demonstrates that plague reservoirs likely existed in southwest Anatolia, near the trade
network that interconnected the wider Ottoman world, heightening the risk of plague
being transmitted along that network. Furthermore, the presence of LIA-induced drought
exacerbated these risks considerable, likely disrupting rodent populations and helping to
further push plague into the very bloodstream of the Empire.
The concentration of plague events fits well with these patterns. Varlik’s
assertion that Istanbul acted as a redistribution center for bubonic plague is undoubtedly
correct; the Ottoman capital experienced plague epidemics 180 years out of the period,
including 44 years out of the 17th century. In the lead-up to the Morean War, Istanbul
hosted plague outbreaks annually from 1670-1679, and again in 1685-1686. Yet Izmir
should not be underestimated as source of plague transmission; no less than 95 plague
outbreaks are recorded in Izmir, with 8 of those in the latter half of the 17th century, and
47 outbreaks in the 18th century. This further illustrates Izmir’s network centrality noted
in Chapter II (Table 1 and Table 2). In the 17th and 18th century, Izmir was the major
gateway to the goods of Anatolia for both British and French merchants (Rycaut 1667;
Raveux 2019), and it was a key port on the route from Ottoman Egypt to Istanbul. It is
no surprise that, in addition to manpower and goods, bubonic plague would flow from its
Anatolian reservoirs towards both Istanbul and Izmir, and from these centers transmitting
around the rest of the Ottoman orbit. The epidemic events we see in western Anatolia are
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significant, with 97 epidemics recorded in the region excepting Izmir; together with Izmir
the number of recorded epidemics is 192. Yet even these high numbers are an
undercount. The available sources we possess for western and central Anatolia largely
consist of the reports of French and British diplomats and travelers in Istanbul and Izmir,
and what reports we get about the Anatolian interior are vague and spotty. It seems
probable that more detailed data exists in the vast array of unpublished Turkish archival
material yet to be studied. Regardless, the data we possess points to significant reservoirs
of plague in western Anatolia, which in turn spread the disease to the wider trade
networks through Istanbul and Izmir.
To the west, plague events appear most frequently in regions or trade nodes with
the most centrality. Thessaloniki, with 9 direct connections in the link analysis and a
betweenness score in the top ten overall of .33, experienced 30 recorded plague
outbreaks. The Adriatic port of Dubrovnik, with 8 connections and .27 on the
betweenness scale, suffered 66 bouts of plague. Chania and Candia on Crete each scored
.0756 on the betweenness scale, but each have 8 direct connections, explaining the 32
epidemics occurring there. But the Morea, intersecting the Ionian and Aegean worlds,
took significant damage over time from plague episodes. A total of 93 plague outbreaks
are recorded for the Peloponnese at large, including 38 references to plague generically
listed in “Morea”, but with a significant number of outbreaks at the major ports, including
5 at Nauplion and 7 at Patras. Methoni and Koroni have the highest centrality scores in
the Peloponnese, with Koroni having 10 direct connections and a .286 betweenness score,
and Methoni having 8 connections and a .149 betweenness score. In turn, Koroni
experienced 9 stretches of bubonic plague, with Methoni suffering 8 bouts with the
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disease. As with Anatolia, there are many lacunae in our source materials, especially for
the Peloponnesian interior, and these numbers only give us a glimpse at the extent of
bubonic plague in the area. Yet we can see that the more important cities within the
network, especially ports that connected the maritime network to the hinterlands, suffered
the greatest exposure to Y. pestis. Plague in the Morean War, 1687-1688
Disease Vector
The appearance of bubonic plague in the Venetian fleet in early 1687 fits into the
wider circulation patterns of plague around the Ottoman Aegean. Identifying the exact
disease vector sparking this plague outbreak proves difficult. Several Venetian accounts
blame the epidemic on a French merchant vessel carrying supplies from the Cyclades to
the Christian fleet at Nauplion (Contarini 1710, 701; Garzoni 1701, 195). The island of
Paros had recently fallen to a Venetian task force, and Turkish provisions captured there
were forwarded on to support the Morean campaign. The captured supplies originated
from Istanbul, the great plague center, and it was presumed that the disease quickly
spread to the Venetian fleet (Locatelli 1691, I: 301; Beregnani 1698, 256). This
explanation is certainly plausible, but it does not tell the complete story. The warnings
from local Greek headmen to Morosini that plague was immanent suggests that plague
had already appeared among the civilian populace of the Morea (Locatelli 1691, I: 300).
Likewise, Contarini describes the plague hitting rural villages first, followed by urban
centers, and only then did it spread into the army’s camp and the fleet (Contarini 1710,
701).
These differing accounts are not mutually exclusive, but rather suggest multivector transmission of plague contagion. We know that plague occurred in Istanbul in
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1685 and 1686, at the very time that Ottoman armies, fleets and supply columns
congregated there prior to deployment to the Morea. New troops also moved in from
more remote plague reservoirs. More than 3000 Turkish reinforcements arrived in early
1687 at Negroponte from Cairo, where plague had raged the year before (Beregnani
1698, 263). Subsequent military and logistical movements likely spread plague via
multiple different routes across the network. Finding plague in captured foodstuffs in the
Cyclades, or spreading from village to village in the rural Morea as Turkish armies
passed by, all at the same time, should be expected. Trying to isolate a single disease
vector for a local epidemic displays a simplistic conception of epidemic disease. Instead,
plague transmission to and within the Morea was as complex as the networks in which it
took place.
Spring 1687 Outbreak
The extent of plague in the Morea in the spring of 1687 is evident in Locatelli’s
recounting. Medical personnel identified plague victims on multiple ships at Nauplion
and reports from garrison commanders at Methoni and Koroni confirmed plague within
their fortress walls (Locatelli 1691, I: 301). Extensive raids by Turkish cavalry into the
Messenian peninsula and the Argolid valley exacerbated the situation by devastating
villages and field, disrupting agriculture and forcing the local populace to flee, all
compounding the dispersal of rats, fleas, and plague bacilli (Beregnani 1698, 261-263).
The command response to the growing plague crisis was swift, dictated by the
extensive institutional experience the Venetian medical establishment possessed
concerning plague. This was a markedly different response than what we saw in the
previous malarial epidemics; in those cases, the only recourse taken was to remove the
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sick to better climates. With the arrival of plague, more specific and extensive measures
were taken. The medical staff led by Protomedicus Drago instituted procedures to
cleanse the fleet of plague miasma, including fumigating the ships, washing the decks
and sailors’ bedding in vinegar, and using various perfumes to drive away pathogenic
odors. These actions, divorced from any true epidemiology of plague, did nothing to stop
it. More effective measures involved control of movement, with all commerce between
ships immediately forbidden, and those infected or suspected of infection separated from
the healthy (Locatelli 1691, I:303). Lorenzo Venier, commander of the Venetian
squadron in the Cyclades, placed the infected into several fishing vessels, while those
“suspected” of plague, sick but with no visible buboes, were shifted over to small sloop
(Locatelli 1691, I:305). Morosini ordered a lazaretto established on the island of
Sapienza opposite Methoni, with separate quarantine facilities for the infected and the
suspected (Locatelli 1691, I: 306). Rudimentary contact-tracing also was instituted.
When an African slave on the San Giuseppe fell ill, officers who recently sailed in his
company were removed to a ship for the “suspected” (Locatelli 1691, I: 316).
The epidemic immediately forestalled plans for the 1687 campaign season. The
extensive loses of the previous year necessitated new recruitment from Germany, netting
4000 Hessian and 2000 more Hanoverian soldiers (Garzoni 1707, 195). Morosini
planned to rendezvous with the new recruits, as well as reinforcements from the Knights
of Malta and the Duchy of Tuscany, at Porto Glimnio on southern Lefkada in early June.
The planned conjunction of forces failed to materialize on time, as the Maltese
commander General d’Herbesteim refused to unite with Morosini, and instead diverted
his force to support operations in the Adriatic (Beregnani 1698, 285). The Tuscan force
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simply returned to their home port of Livorno upon hearing of plague in Morosini’s fleet
(Beregnani 1698, 288). For his part, Morosini sailed for Glimnio, only to have several
ships turn back to Koroni as plague cases appeared onboard. Even after arrival at
Lefkada cases continued to appear, with more ships isolated from the rest of the fleet.
Ships with “suspected” cases quarantined off the nearby island of Kalamos, with all
movement between ships forbidden on penalty of death (Locatelli 1691, I: 320). In
addition, as new troops arrived on Lefkada, Morosini forbade any contact between them
and veteran units, even those that had no plague cases, in order to prevent spreading the
disease to the reinforcements.
The extended quarantine lifted on July 20th, celebrated with a muster of the
reunited army before Morosini and Königsmarck, and the Te Deum was sung in
thanksgiving for deliverance from Il contagio (Locatelli 1691, I:328). The final death toll
from the spring of 1687 plague epidemic is unclear, but we know that it compounded
heavily upon the malarial losses from the previous year. Zorzi Emo recorded 14300
soldiers at Porto Glimnio on May 27th, 1686 (Pinzelli 2021, 104 n.1). A year later, on
July 25th, 1687, Emo tallied 7983 deaths among soldiers and 793 deaths in the fleet,
totaling 8776 deaths, which constituted a 61% attrition rate (Pinzelli 2021, 345). This
annual death toll encompassed both the malarial epidemic at Nauplion from July to
October 1686 as well as the bubonic plague outbreak of spring of 1687, in addition to
combat actions at Navarino, Methoni, Argos, and Nauplion. It is notable that foreign
troops, primarily Germans, accounted for 58% of the dead among ground forces, well
above the mortality rate for the Venetian contingent (41%) (Pinzelli 2021, 345). We can
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attribute this divergence in mortality rates, in part, to the lack of malarial exposure among
the German regiments.
Fall 1687 to Spring 1688
Despite heavy losses from disease the previous year, the influx of newly recruited
reinforcements gave Morosini a large and highly capable force for his delayed 1687
campaign season. On July 22nd Morosini landed a force of 14,000 Christian soldiers near
Patras, the principal port of the northern Peloponnese. Two days later Königsmarck led
this army against entrenched Turkish positions just below the fortress walls, routing the
last remaining Ottoman field army in the Morea (Finlay 1877, 183). Consequently,
remaining Turkish forces abandoned the Peloponnese, withdrawing into Attica. The
great fortress at Acrocorinth, overlooking the Isthmus of Corinth and guarding entrance
to the Peloponnese, was burned and abandoned by its garrison on August 7th. Maniot
irregulars forced the surrender of several inland towns, including Mistras and Karytaina.
Only the rocky bastion of Monemvasia held out against Christian forces, not succumbing
until 1690 (Andrews 2006, 160). The Morea seemed firmly in Venetian hands, and these
final conquests prompted the Venetian Senate to grant Morosini the triumphal title
Peloponnasiacus (Locatelli 1691, I:353).
A war council made up of Morosini, Königsmarck, Brunswick, and the other
main officers met at Acrocorinth on September 17th to discuss their next move. Despite
reservations about its military utility, Morosini agreed to launch an immediate attack on
Athens, just across the Saronic Gulf from Corinth. Within days a force of 9880 infantry
and 871 cavalry landed at Porto Lione, the port of Athens, and moved inland to besiege
the Turkish garrison fortified on the Acropolis. The initial bombardment was hampered
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by incompetent gunnery and frequent Turkish cavalry raids emanating out of the Ottoman
base at Thebes (Mommsen 1941). The siege turned on September 26th, when a Venetian
mortar round struck the Parthenon, the 5th century BCE temple and one of the wonders of
the ancient world. Over the millennia the Parthenon had successively been a pagan
temple, a Christian church, and a mosque, but on this particular day it was also a
gunpowder store, and the explosion ignited by the mortar round gutted the ancient
structure and killed 300 soldiers of the garrison. This explosion and the failure of another
Turkish cavalry sortie the next day precipitated the surrender of the garrison. Athens and
its remaining antiquities fell into Christian hands.
The abbreviated 1687 campaign seemed to result in striking successes, with the
Morea firmly under Venetian control and Turkish forces on their back foot. Yet despite
these real successes, Morosini faced numerous challenges as winter loomed. Turkish
cavalry continued to raid into Attica, taking slaves from among the local Greek populace
and ravaging the countryside. Corsairs operating around Kythera intercepted supplies
meant to feed the Christian army at Athens, and payroll issues caused unrest and
desertion among the German mercenaries (Locatelli 1691, II:10-11). But the specter of
plague overshadowed all of these concerns. The minutes of the war council held on
October 2, 1687 are dominated by reports of plague. The Turkish populace of Mistras
could not be expelled from the region for fear of further spreading the disease. More
concerning were new outbreaks reported in central and northern Peloponnese, including
at Tropolizza, Trikkala, and at Kalavryta and a cluster of nearby villages on the slopes of
Mount Panachaikon. The dispersal of plague across the breadth of the Morea, even into
mountain villages, deeply concerned the Venetian command staff. Morosini blamed the
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widespread interactions of the local peasantry for transmission of the plague, a direct
consequence of war-induced refugee movements. Morosini ordered local Greek
headmen to shut down all trade and other commerce across the peninsula, though the
efficacy of this prohibition is debatable (Laborde 1854, 166-67).
By early November rumors of plague in the Turkish camp at Thebes reached
Morosini, and he rightly feared that the contagion would reach his own winter camp at
Athens. He immediately ordered a cessation of all trade between the Athenian populace
and nearby villages, even though this worsened his own supply situation (Locatelli 1691,
II: 13). This only delayed the inevitable, and on Christmas Day plague deaths were
reported in Athens. Morosini ordered the houses of the victims burned and a lazaretto set
up (Locatelli 1691, II: 34). In a dispatch to the Senate on January 2nd, 1688, Morosini
reported plague outbreaks throughout Venetian held territory, including Patras, Castel
Tornese, Naupaktos, and Koroni. Ottoman Greece fared no better, with plague still
haunting Thebes, but also northward to Negroponte, the Bay of Talanda, Volos, and the
island of Skopelos, all of which sat along maritime supply routes to Istanbul (Laborde
1854, 180-181). Shortly thereafter cases appeared among refugees on the islands of
Salamis and Aegina, and the plague “rekindled” at Navarino and Koroni (Locatelli 1691,
II:39). The situation in Athens continued to deteriorate; in addition to a growing plague
epidemic and repeated Turkish raids, heavy snows and strong northerly bora winds
prevented supply vessels from approaching Porto Lione, severely limiting the stock of
biscotti for the troops (Locatelli 1691, II: 42-43).
Athens proved too exposed to both Turkish raids and to plague transmission from
the countryside, and in March 1688 Morosini ordered the evacuation of the city,
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including both the army and the civilian populace. Plague continued to spread, and strict
quarantine procedures were put in place. No land-to-ship or ship-to-ship commerce was
permitted before the actual evacuation took place, in order to limit transmission and allow
for the identification of the infect. No new vessels could enter Porto Lione, again
limiting the possibility of infecting newcomers. A new lazaretto was established at
Kalamos, a rocky island just off Porto Glimnio on Lefkada, an isolated spot far from the
epicenter of the plague epidemic yet close of a ready source of supply (Locatelli 1691,
II:48-49). The final evacuation took place April 8-10, with Athenian civilians sent to
Aegina, Corinth and Vonitsa to repopulate abandoned villages, and the Christian army
sailed across the Saronic Gulf to Porto Poro. The sick were sent onward to the Kalamos
lazaretto, while the remaining troops were carefully separated into small, squad level
groupings to limit infection and ease contact-tracing. Over 100 soldiers grew sick and
died within days. For the next 6 weeks numerous soldiers and officers perished at Porto
Poro, at Kalamos, and aboard ships in transit. The final death toll for late 1687 into the
spring of 1688 totaled 1000 soldiers and 500 sailors (Locatelli 1691, II: 53-58).
Conclusion: The Passing of the Plague Wave
The strict quarantine imposed at Porto Poro and at the Kalamos lazaretto proved
effective. At the height of the epidemic in April 1688, 60 to 70 soldiers fell ill each day,
with 30 dying (Pinzelli 202, 141-142). By early May, the epidemic burned itself out, and
the only reported sick remained at Kalamos, allowing Morosini to prepare his next
operation (Locatelli 1691, II:57). Several salient features stand out about the 1687-1688
plague epidemic. First, the overall response of the Venetian commanders to the
appearance of plague differed markedly from the malarial outbreaks in previous
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campaign seasons. Malarial infections were simply attributed to the “climate of the east”,
effectively blaming local landscapes of the areas they were fighting over. This
explanation, while imprecise, is not entirely unfounded. As we have already noted
malarial epidemics were a function of the geography of the Morean battlespace. Without
any detailed knowledge of the epidemiology of malaria, the only thing Morosini and his
commanders knew to do was remove the sick to better climates.
The reaction to plague differed greatly. The medical staff led by Protomedicus
Draga was primed to combat plague by previous Venetian epidemics, and was
forewarned about the impending epidemic by local Greeks. When plague appeared, it
was swiftly diagnosed and long-standing protocols were immediately enacted. Given the
lack of an epidemiological understanding of bubonic plague, some of these protocols
failed to have any meaningful effect. Ventilation and fumigation measures, based upon
the classical miasma theory of disease transmission, proved useless in combatting an
epizootic bacterium. Extensive quarantine measures, however, including prohibiting
contact between vessels, separating encamped soldiers into smaller groups, and
identifying the sick and placing them in lazarettos, directly impeded the movement of
plague, especially the pneumonic version of the disease. These measures were not
perfect by any means. Rodents and their infected fleas still circulated within military
camps. But isolating the sick from the healthy clearly limited the spread of the disease,
allowing the epidemic to burn itself out. The use of rudimentary contact tracing and
preventing newly arrived recruits from mixing with those who already exposed further
limited disease transmission. While overall knowledge of plague epidemiology was
deficient, the methods used were effective to a great degree. Given that bubonic plague
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carries a 60-80% case mortality rate, the only effective means of staving off large death
tolls is preventing infection in the first place. The loss of 1500 soldiers and sailors in the
spring of 1688 is remarkably low, especially compared to the much higher death tolls
from previous malarial outbreaks. This is testament to at least limited efficacy of
Venetian plague procedures.

99

CHAPTER V – MALARIA REDUX: THE SIEGE OF NEGROPONTE AND THE END
OF THE MOREAN WAR.
Once freed from quarantine, the Christian army struck out towards a crucial
strategic target, Negroponte (modern Chalkis). Negroponte sits on the eastern coast of
the island of Evia, midway up the Euboean Gulf, where the gulf narrows to a channel less
than a kilometer wide. The channel is easily spanned by a bridge connecting the island to
the Greek mainland, which also allows control of the channel. Venice held Negroponte
and Evia as a critical part of the Stato da Mar until Mehmet II besieged the city in 1470.
Retaking Negroponte would satisfy a revanchist impulse on the part of the Venetian state,
as well as reclaim a vital base along a strategic corridor. Negroponte scores in the top 10
in the both the Degree Centrality Analysis (Table 1) with 9 connections, and in the
Between Centrality Analysis (Table 2), with a score of .42675.
By the end of June, Morosini began assembling his forces, including veterans
released from quarantine on Kalamos and Porto Poro, and new recruits arriving from
Venice and other members of the Holy League. This included another regiment of 1200
Hanoverians and nearly 1200 Swiss mercenaries. Additional Maltese forces and
Albanian irregulars brought the overall force to between 13,000 and 14,000 effectives,
the largest Christian force yet assembled (Schwenke 1854, 164; Pinzelli 2021, 143).
However, the Turks expected an attack on Negroponte, and built extensive outer works
on the eastern approaches to the city, as well as Karababa Fortress on the Greek
mainland, just above the critical bridge. A sizeable garrison of at least 6000 soldiers
manned the Turkish defenses (Andrews 2006, 183-184).
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The Siege of Negroponte: July to October 1688
Morosini, recently elected Doge of Venice in absentia, landed much of his
infantry on July 11th, 1688, just south of Negroponte. The troops trekked the several
miles through “woods and swamps” to begin digging siege lines east of the city (Pinzelli
2021, 145). By attacking Negroponte from the east, Morosini committed several tactical
errors that shaped the subsequent campaign. Königsmarck unsuccessfully argued that the
army should land on the mainland and attack Karababa first, severing Negroponte from
sources of resupply and reinforcement. More importantly, establishing siege lines and
camps east of Negroponte placed the Christian army firmly in a malaria-ridden bog. A
contemporary map of the siege, produced at the behest of Francesco Grimani, a Venetian
officer, clearly depicts numerous marshes and swamps east of Negroponte, on the very
ground the Venetians built their camp and siege trenches. A reconstruction of the
Grimani map presented here (Map 9) shows marshy ground within the walls of the
Venetian camp, as well as a large swamp directly to the east. Additionally, the main
siege trenches approaching the Turkish works moved through a swampy bog.
Predictably Negroponte and its surroundings score in the redzone of the Malarial Risk
Analysis (Map 6), and the siege took place in the prime months for mosquito
propagation. The summer of 1688 exhibited severe drought conditions (Map 8), further
intensifying malarial risk. These spatial and temporal factors, along with the arrival of
fresh, and non-immune, reinforcements from northern Europe, set the stage for a major
epidemic.
The siege of Negroponte was the most violent and costly clash of the entire war.
Both the Christians and the Turks heavily fortified their earthworks and deployed dozens
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of artillery pieces, and the battle revolved around artillery duels, sorties, and countersorties, resulting in high combat casualties in the trenches. Among those dying in battle
were Girolamo Garzoni, brother of a later historian of the war, and Father Antonio
d’Asiago, Morosini’s own chaplain, slain by a Turkish cannonball (Locatelli 1691, II:
115; Garzoni 1707, 259). However savage the combat, disease again proved a more
efficient killer. Malaria stalked the Christian camp, striking down soldiers in the
thousands within weeks of the start of the siege. As many as 2000 soldiers were sickened
by the beginning of August, with those serving in the marshy trenches bearing the brunt
of infection (Locatelli 1691, II:106). The newly recruited regiments, as at Koroni and at
Nauplion, suffered high rates of infection and mortality. Anna Akerhjelm, Locatelli, and
Garzoni all note that the Maltese contingent fell ill first, followed closely by the latest
Hanoverian, Hessian, and Swiss mercenaries to arrive in theater (Akerhjelm 1854, 247;
Locatelli 1691, II: 104; Garzoni 1707, 256).
The officer corps suffered heavily as well. Locatelli identifies a number of
Venetian officers struck down by malaria; Henrico Filippo fell sick by August 1st and the
Prince of Turin took ill on August 8th (107-108), while Scipone Gaspardo, Matteo Bon
and Prince Palatine Degrace all died by August 15th (108-110). Aurelio Marcello died on
September 5th (121) and Matteo Quirini succumbed by October 5th. Morosini himself fell
sick with intermittent fevers in early October. Protomedicus Draga treated the Doge
personally, while Morosini went to confession and Mass, seeking the help of the
“celestial doctor”, in addition to his earthly one (Locatelli 1691, II:158). The Venetians
and their Christian allies relied on both contemporary medical science as well as Divine
Providence in combatting the epidemic.
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Map 9: Reconstruction of the Grimani Map of the Siege of Negroponte, 1688 (Andrews 2006, Plate XXXV)
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The most prominent victim of the malarial epidemic at Negroponte was
Königsmarck. Despite surviving a malarial infection at Nauplion 2 years previously, the
general began to suffer severe fevers by early August, likely due to a differing species or
strain of malaria found around Negroponte. Anna Akerhjelm was infected as well, along
with many others in Königsmarck’s household; Johann Roloff, their quartermaster, died
within 3 days of extreme fever (Akerhjelm 1854, 249). Anna recovered, but her diary
entries and letters record the progression of Königsmarck’s illness. From late July into
early August the general had high fevers for 11 days straight, relenting on August 4th,
though he remained fatigued to the point of being unable to walk without assistance
(Akerhjelm 1854, 249, 277). Königsmarck was forced to convalesce aboard ship, away
from the dangerous miasmas of the swamps, but he did have the vessel pulled to within
sight of the battlelines to watch assaults on the Turkish works. On August 22nd the
general rejoined the army ashore to much fanfare, but by the 24th his fevers returned,
evidence of the harsh recrudescence often occurring in P. falicparum infections
(Akerhjelm 1854, 277). Anna then describes the classic progression of the disease; “The
fever, which held him without relenting from August 30 to September 13, was renewed
every day at different times.” (Akerhjelm 1854, 253). The high fevers recurring on a
daily, or quotidian basis are the tell-tale sign of P. falciparum. Otto von Königsmarck,
the victorious commander at Argos, Nauplion, Patras, and Athens, died of malaria on
September 15th, 1688 (Akerhjelm 1854, 283).
The vast number of soldiers and officers struck down by malaria hampered siege
efforts considerably. In late August, 4000 German, Swiss and Venetian reinforcements
arrived, allowing for new assaults on the outer Turkish works. The assault of August
104

22nd breached the Turkish lines, and their subsequent retreat behind the walls of
Negroponte turned into a rout. Over 1500 Turks were killed, but 700 Christians fell in
the assault as well (Cappelletti 1854, 66; Andrews 2006, 184). The battle lines then
centered on the medieval walls of Negroponte itself, but September 1688 saw the efficacy
of the Venetian army further reduced by disease, with thousands of troops sidelined in the
hospital. Many soldiers deserted, while others fled the trenches for the relative safety of
the fleet, forcing Morosini to forbid anyone leaving the camp on penalty of death
(Locatelli 1691, II:126). The Maltese contingent, having lost 400 soldiers and 24
knights, sailed for home, followed by the Florentines; between desertion, departures, and
disease, Morosini’s forces were reduced to 4000 effective troops by October 1st (Pinzelli
2021, 150). Despite the gravity of the situation, Christian forces doggedly continued
their assaults on the walls, with their efforts focusing on a weakened tower at the
northwest corner of the city. After landing sailors from the fleet as reinforcements,
Morosini ordered one last assault on October 12th. The vulnerable northwest tower was
briefly taken and a breach formed, but a Turkish counterattack routed Christian forces
and inflicted terrible casualties, with over 1000 Christians killed. Morosini began a
withdrawal the next day, completing the evacuation of his remaining troops as well as
6000 Evian Greeks from Negroponte by October 22nd (Locatelli 1691, II: 143; Cappelletti
1854, 67).
The Butcher’s Bill: Negroponte and the War at Large
The failed siege of Negroponte marks the climax of the Morean War. The
conflict would not officially end until the Peace of Karlowitz in January 1699, but the
pace of combat operations in the Aegean slowed significantly after Negroponte.
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Monemvasia, the last Turkish holdout in the Peloponnese, surrendered in August 1690,
and Domenico Mocenigo lead an abortive attempt to take Canea on Crete in the summer
of 1692. Several fortresses in Dalmatia fell to Venetian forces, and Turkish raids into the
Morea continued into the late 1690s, but the days of major combat largely ended in 1688.
Doge Morosini, aged and sick, attempted to revive the war effort by taking direct
command of the Venetian fleet in 1693. While he bolstered the defense of the Morea,
little else was achieved, and Morosini died at Nauplion on January 6, 1694 (Setton 1991,
386-388).
Mortality at Negroponte, 1688
Negroponte was a devastating experience for all involved. Paolo Nani, a
Venetian commissary officer, reported to the Senate on November 30, 1688 a loss of
6136 soldiers, with another 2016 sick and injured. Nani bitterly remarked that most of
the sick subsequently succumbed due to the inattentiveness of their officers, indicating
that his fatality count was provisional at best. As with the previous campaigns, the
coming and going of various contingents makes establishing accurate numbers
impossible, but the approximate tally we possess shows 13,500 soldiers initially landed at
Negroponte, with 4000 reinforcements in August, a total of 17,500 effectives during the
siege. Following Nani’s figures, the overall mortality rate was between 35% (6126 dead)
and 45% (8162 dead and subsequent fatalities) (Pinzelli 2021, 259). A mortality rate of
+/- 40% is evidenced by the experience of the Hanoverian regiment serving at
Negroponte. Of the 63 serving officers, 26 died at Negroponte, resulting in a mortality of
41%.

Only 1 of the 26 casualties is listed as killed-in-action, and the remainder have no

cause of death noted, so we cannot reliably assert how many died of disease. Yet it is
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clear that a majority of deaths at Negroponte stemmed from malarial infection, and that it
spared neither the musketeer in the trenches nor the general in the command tent.
Mortality for the entire war, 1684-1689
The overall death toll/mortality rate for the entire Morean War is similarly
difficult to tally, again due to the imperfect accounting of commissary officers and the
perpetually fluid nature of Christian forces. The most detailed numbers come from the
muster rolls of the German regiments hired by the Venetian Senate. As noted above,
these soldiers represented some of the best infantry in all of Europe, but they were
uniquely susceptible to malarial infections present in their Mediterranean battlespaces.
Exposure to malaria without any acquired immunity, coupled with the plague epidemic of
1687-1688, repeated exposure to drought conditions, and multiple high-intensity military
operations led to the devastation of these German forces. The mortality rates (Table 4)
exhibited by the various German units is stark with an overall rate of 60%, with some
regiments exhibiting death rates 75% - 82%. Losses may have been lower in an
individual battle or campaign, like the 40% fatality rate at Negroponte, but over the
course of a multi-year campaign casualty rates crept upward. More exposure to disease,
the repeated risks of combat, and secondary infections exacerbated by the physicals
stressors of the campaign killed a larger proportion of soldiers over an extended period.
While the exact number of casualties remains unknown, it is clear that the majority of
German mercenaries deployed to Greece 1684-1689 died on campaign, and that disease
was the principal killer.
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Table 4: Mortality Rate among German Mercenaries, 1684-1689. (Wilson 1998, 78).
German State

Total serving

Losses

Mortality Rate

Bayreuth

2000

1500

75%

Waldek

1000

Unknown

Unknown

Wolfenbutel

1210

910

75%

Württemberg

4532

2769

61%

Saxony

3000

2239

75%

Hessen-Kessel

1000

820

82%

Hanover

5600

3000

54%

Sachsen-

100

Unknown

Unknown

18442

11238

61%

Meiningen
Total
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CHAPTER VI – LANDSCAPE CHANGE IN THE MOREA, 1684-1700
In January 1691 Giacomo Corner, submitted his relazione, or official report, on
his stint as Provveditor General in Morea¸ governor of the newly conquered region.
While describing the Morean landscape, Corner eloquently noted “her [the Morea] beauty
languished upon my arrival, amid the paroxysm of the contagion that barbarously
reigned, and the wounds opened by the contingencies of war.” (Corner 1691, 296).
Corner’s immediate successor, Tadeo Gradenigo, decried the general destitution of the
Morea (Gradenigo 1692, 238) while Andrea Molin was even more specific, calling
attention to the large number of abandoned villages and the wide dispersal of the
population across the countryside (Molin 1693, 432-434). Indeed, all of the Provedditori
of the Morea from 1691 to 1715 describe large-scale depopulation of the region, with
ghost villages dotting the landscape, and alleviating the population shortage was central
to their official duties (Topping 1972, 71). The Venetian government needed the Morea
to produce agricultural goods for trade, and in turn, taxable income. The relazioni, as
well as the highly detailed cadastral surveys and maps produced by Venetian officials, all
revolve around making the Morea produce greater quantities of commodities like grain,
wine, olive oil, cheese, leather, and silk. Yet the overall fertility of the Peloponnese was
never in question; the problem was a lack of manpower to exploit the agricultural
resources of the region.
Warfare can change landscapes in a variety of ways, from disruption to the
rhythms of agriculture and industry, to destruction of infrastructure, to shifts in the
demographic make-up of the human populace. We should reasonably expect the Morean
War to have changed the landscape of the Peloponnese in some way, but identifying
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those changes and the complex mechanisms behind them is difficult. However, the
extensive Venetian cadastral records produced immediately following the war allow us to
reconstruct many of these changes within a GIS-enabled environment. Of course, these
sources have limitations, but we can still identify the degree to which the population fell,
where it fell, and identify possible catalysts behind the demographic shifts.
Quantifying and Geo-locating Population Change in the Morea, 1684-1690
Early modern states, including both the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman
Empire, developed many of the tools of modern bureaucratic government, especially with
regard to taxation. Cadastral surveys proliferated across the early modern Mediterranean
to provide tax officials with detailed information on property ownership or tenancy, land
valuation, and potential tax burden. These records also provide valuable demographic
data, giving modern historians and geographers a snapshot of what a specific property
looked like at a given time Actual cadastral methods differed between states, but they
often collected data on number of households, agricultural products, livestock, slaves,
and any other taxable property or chattel. By comparing such records, we can observe
population shifts over time.
An Ottoman census completed circa 1530, during the dynamic reign of Suleiman
the Magnificent, counts the population according to individual hearths (households), and
categorizes these according to religion, as non-Muslim families paid the jizyah head-tax,
and Christian families were potentially liable for the devşirme, the levy of young men for
service in the Janissary Corps. The 1530 census shows the Ottoman Morea possessing
50,541 total hearths, with 1065 Muslim, 464 Jewish, and 49,412 Christian households
(Barkan 1957, 32). This census data allows for a population estimate; Barkan argued for
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a coefficient of 5, resulting in an approximate population of 250,000, while Topping uses
more detailed figures from a later Venetian census to support a coefficient of 4, which
renders a population of around 200,000 (Topping 1972, 70). Therefore, we can
reasonably contend that the Peloponnese in the early 16th century supported a populace of
200,000 to 250,000.
The situation in the Morea by the late-17th century was markedly different.
Giacomo Corner’s work as Provveditor in 1689-1690 took place as major combat ceased
in the Morea, save for occasional Turkish cavalry raids. His description of the
Peloponnesian countryside noted above is stark; the Morea suffered terribly from the
intertwined forces of plague and warfare. Corner’s population count reflects these forces,
tallying only 86,468 persons of all ages and sexes on the peninsula, excepting the regions
of Maina and Corinth, on which he possessed no information (Corner 1691, 301).
Working alongside Corner were three catastico sindaci, officials proceeding with a
detailed cadastral survey. Their final report, presented to the Senate in May 1691, found
97,118 souls across the Morea, only excluding the remote Maina peninsula, thus fitting
closely with Corner’s report (Molin 1691, 214; Topping 1972, 71). Whatever numerical
discrepancies, the population of the Morea had fallen by more than half since the census
of 1530.
This severe drop in population is evidenced by the many abandoned villages
dotting the Peloponnesian landscape. Each of the Provveditori from 1689-1699 describe
many ghost towns throughout the Morea, but the numbers are only quantified under
Francesco Grimani, Provveditori Generale from 1699-1701. Grimani’s cadaster
extensively details all the Venetian Morea, down to the level of individual villages, either
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inhabited or abandoned. The cadastral count of inhabited versus abandoned villages
appears repeatedly in discussion of the Morea, including Pacifico (1704), von Ranke
(1878), and more recently by both Topping (1972) and Wagstaff (1978).
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The Grimani survey shows a total of 1796 villages in the Peloponnese, with 302
of them abandoned, or 16.8%. The cadaster breaks down the number of
inhabited/abandoned villages per Venetian district, and Wagstaff attempts a kind of
spatial analysis based upon the mean number of abandoned towns per district (Wagstaff
1978, 297-299). Using this method, he finds a significantly greater mean number of
abandoned villages across the northern Peloponnese, from Corinth in the northeast to
Castugni in the northwest. Excepting Corinth these areas remained beyond most of the
fighting in the Morea War, and regions that experienced major combat, notably the
Messenian peninsula, allowing Wagstaff to conclude that much of the village
abandonment occurred prior to the war, not because of it (Wagstaff 1978, 305).
However, major weaknesses exist in Wagstaff’s argument. First, the cadaster
constrains Wagstaff to use the Venetian district boundaries, which are of unequal size and
population densities. For example, the districts of Castugni, Kalavryta and Corinth are
substantially larger than those of Navarino, Methoni and Koroni in the southwest. This
exemplifies the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP), in which uneven spatial
divisions can distort the data. More importantly, major discrepancies exist between the
cadastral totals and the maps produced by Grimani’s cartographer, Francesco Van Dyke.
A number of these maps survive, along with their attached catalogs, and they explicitly
mark abandoned villages as distrutta, or destroyed (Katsiarda-Hering 2018). For
purposes of this study a table was created from these maps, with the villages geolocated
with X-Y coordinates and classified as inhabited or abandoned. Point features were
created from the X-Y data in ArcGIS Pro 2.9, and road features were derived from the
Expédition Scientifque de Moree Tome I (Atlas) (Guizot 1855). A DEM layer was
113

created from EU-Copernicus data (Copernicus Land Monitoring Service 2021a), and the
feature layers were overlaid upon it. A Point Density Analysis was performed on the
abandoned villages, resulting in Map 10. A Global Moran’s I analysis for autocorrelation
showed significant clustering, with a z-score of 14.77765.
The surviving maps do not cover the entire Peloponnese, unlike the detailed
cadasters referenced by von Ranke, Wagstaff and Topping, but they provide far more
precise geographic placement. The resulting analysis generally correlates with the
cadastral evidence; of the 717 villages appearing on the maps, 139 are labelled as
distrutta, destroyed or derelict. This produces an abandonment rate of 19.3%, only 2.4
percentage points off the overall cadastral rate of 16.3%, a discrepancy easily explained
by the lacunae in the map coverage. The analysis significantly differs on the geographic
distribution of abandoned sites. The Point Density Analysis identifies several significant
clusters of village ruins in the central and southwestern Peloponnese, in stark contrast to
Wagstaff’s analysis. Proximity to major roads is a near universal attribute of all the
abandoned villages, with none of them sitting more than 5km from any roadway. But
several clusters exist near major crossroads, notably around Tropolizza, the central
crossroads within the Morea, and along the Androusa-Leontari roadway, what acted as a
regional nexus in the southwest portion of the peninsula. Separate clusters appear on
connecting roads, including a small cluster on the north-south path between Tropolizza
and Kalavryta, and a highly intense cluster along the road connecting Karitena to Prygos
on the Ionian coast. A similar concentration appears around Vostissa in the northeast.
Each of these roads and the nexus points along them would have witnessed considerably
military movements during the war,
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Map 10: Point Density Analysis of Village Abandonment using the Grimani Maps.
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especially as Turkish forces used interior lines of communication. Refugees would have
moved along them as well.
Several other clusters, while along the road network, stand out for other reasons.
The cluster of abandoned villages to the southwest of Patras, in the Northern
Peloponnese, sit near the site of the Battle of Patras in July 1687. The most intense
concentration of deserted villages appears on the Messenian Peninsula in the southwest,
which experienced 4 major sieges in 1685 and 1686, at Koroni, Old Navarion, New
Navarino and Methoni. Finding the ruins of so many villages in proximity to major
combat zones is expected, but other factors may be relevant as well. The most unusual
cluster is found on the southern slopes of Mount Panachiako near Patras. Seven deserted
villages appear in this remote area, which is accessed by a single road that dead-ends on
the mountain itself, and the ghost towns all sit above 1000m, the only ruins found at that
height in the entire study area.
Establishing a causal relationship between village abandonment and the ravages
of the Morean War seems like a simple matter. However, significant declines in
population and widespread abandonment of entire settlements rarely takes place
overnight, and evidence suggests that the process of depopulation was long standing by
the Morean War. Numerous European travelers noted the general emptiness of the
Morea in the 17th century, including the English writer Bernard Randolph, who wandered
the Morea in the later 1670s, just prior to the war (Randolph 1683). Venetian officials
noted that the devşirme, the levy of Christian boys, fell heavily on Peloponnesian
communities, and frequent revolts by the Maniots and other Greeks resulted in many
deaths and encouraged emigration to safer areas (Topping 1972. 70-71).
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Yet whatever long-term forces influenced depopulation in the Peloponnese, the
ravages of the Morean War undoubtedly intensified the process. The Point Density
Analysis reflects patterns expected during a conflict, with clusters of deserted villages
near areas of major combat actions and along the route of armies, supply trains, and
refugee movements. The contemporary sources bear this out, detailing various forms of
violence and chaos inflicted upon the civilian populace of the Peloponnese, including
ethnic cleansing perpetrated by both Christian and Turkish forces, and the spread of
bubonic plague across the Morea landscape, which was heavily exacerbated by the war.
Ethnic Cleansing in the Morean War
The Morean War occurred for a variety of political, economic, and military
reasons, but the religious character of the war is undeniable. This is not to say that
religion caused the war, but once ignited the participants viewed the struggle through the
long-standing lens of Christian-Muslim holy war, and this effected the course of the
conflict. For the Venetians and their Christian allies this meant that Muslim Turks,
including civilians, had to be removed from newly conquered territories and that local
Christians, even those long under Turkish rule, were regarded as allies. On the same
account the Turks saw the Greek Christians of the Peloponnese, the overwhelming
majority of the population, as untrustworthy and a potential fifth column. Ethno-religious
categorization of local populaces played a major part in the strategies of the opposing
powers. For instance, the decision to besiege Koroni in 1685 was heavily influenced by
the need to support the Greek Christians of the Mani peninsula, just across the Messenian
Gulf from Koroni. Likewise, the Ottomans populated the major cities of the Peloponnese
with Turkish Muslims, in a large part to secure them as fortified points that dominated a
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largely Christian countryside (Randolph 1683, 15). In these circumstances ethnic
cleansing, in various forms, became a strategic took for the opposing powers.
Siege warfare and ethnic cleansing: the Venetian policy
From the beginning of the war Venetian policy called for the removal of Muslims
from newly conquered cities. Siege warfare relied on a simple, cold-blooded calculus; if
the defenders capitulated, even after a heated defense of the walls, they could negotiate
terms and expect some kind of reasonable treatment. At a minimum this meant the
surviving garrison and populace kept their lives and, most often their freedom and some
of their chattel. Conversely, if the city resisted to the point an assault on the walls was
necessary, with the severe casualties it would entail on the attacking troops, then the
garrison and inhabitants forfeited their lives and goods. The Venetians utilized this
bloody equation quite effectively throughout the Morean War. Morosini consistently
offered simple terms of surrender to Turkish garrisons, in which Muslims retained their
lives and freedom, Christian slaves held by the Turks were freed, and Mori, or black
slaves, were relinquished to the Venetian conquerors.
However, Muslims could not remain in the Peloponnese unless they converted to
Christianity. The evacuation of Muslims populations from Morean urban centers to other
parts of the Ottoman Empire played a major role in depopulating the region. The small
garrison of Old Navarino, capitulating in early June 1686, sailed to Alexandria, to be
followed later that month by 3000 Turkish citizens of New Navarino, who sailed to Libya
(Locatelli 1691 I: 203, 224-25). The garrison of Methoni surrendered on July 10, 1686,
and 4000 Muslims evacuated the city for North Africa (Locatelli 1691, I:236). The
extended siege of Nauplion in August 1686 ended with a Turkish surrender, and Morosini
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granted the Muslim population 10 days to leave the city with their belongings, though he
granted Jewish families the right to stay, in return for an annual subsidy to the Venetian
government (Locatelli 1691, I: 269). The 3500 Turks who survived the devastating
explosion of the Parthenon accepted Morosini’s terms in late September 1687, sailing to
Izmir five days later (Locatelli 1691, II: 5; Morosini et. al., 1688, 40). Some of the
Muslim garrison of Chlemoutsi fortress, in the far western Peloponnese, agreed to
evacuate to Izmir, but 150 soldiers chose to convert to Christianity and remain in the
Morea (Locatelli 1691, 341). Such conversions were not uncommon, as some Turkish
landowners hoped to retain their properties. Michiel’s cadaster of 1691 records 3577
Turkish converts to Christianity (Michel 1691, 214).
Not all these sieges ended so peacefully. The siege of Koroni (1685) witnessed
some of the most savage combat of the entire conflict, only topped by the later experience
at Negroponte. At one point the Venetian contingent found itself sandwiched between
the walls of Koroni and a Turkish relief force, a siege-within-a-siege that resulted in
numerous sorties and counter-sorties against opposing trenches. On August 11, 1685,
having repelled the relief army, Christian engineers detonated a mine under the walls of
the city, opening a breach. The Turkish garrison immediately raised the flag of
surrender, but as officers negotiated terms a cannon went off within the fortress. Though
likely an accidental shot, this event scuttled the surrender and caused Christian forces to
surge into the city, putting it to a brutal sack. Some 1500 of the garrison and their
families were killed, with their corpses cast into the sea (Locatelli 1691, I: 151; Andrews
2006, 12-13).
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The Muslim population of Mistras suffered genocidal violence after they
peacefully surrendered, though in unusual circumstances. Mistras, a fortress-town
looming over the Vale of Sparta, resisted a siege by Maniot Greeks throughout the spring
and summer of 1687, only yielding after all Turkish armies had evacuated the
Peloponnese. Angered by the prolonged siege and with no threat of a Turkish relief
force, Morosini refused to grant the populace his normal terms. Rather, he threatened to
enslave all able-bodied men between 17 and 50, unless they paid a ransom of 200,000
reales. Unable to pay the heavy sum, the Turkish chiefs counter-offered that they would
leave all their possessions in exchange for their freedom. Morosini initially agreed, but
the appearance of plague at Mistras in Fall 1687 forced him to order a quarantine of the
city. During the winter the Muslims sequestered at Mistras proved uncontrollable, with
many breaking quarantine to flee into the countryside, and others threatening to re-fortify
the city against the Christian army. Morosini, losing whatever patience he possessed,
ordered the Turks of Mistras to be seized, and he savagely enacted his earlier threats.
Over 300 children were removed from their families and baptized, 700 able bodied men
enslaved and sent to the Venetian galleys, and the remaining women and children
deposited on the desolate shores of Attica, where they were fodder for plague, banditry,
or starvation (Andrews 2006, 159-161). Even contemporary Christian historians decried
Morosini’s savagery in this instance (Locatelli 1691, II:46; Garzoni 1707, 263).
Razzia: Turkish raids on Greek Christian territories.
Turkish strategy in the Morea, apart from repelling Venetian forces, centered
upon suppressing any local Greek support for the invaders. The Christian populace of the
Morea, as well as other parts of Greek, frequently rebelled against their Ottoman
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overlords, especially when offered the support of foreign powers. Therefore, local
Ottoman commanders instinctively ordered attacks on Greek villages. When Morosini’s
fleet entered the Gulf of Arta in 1684 he immediately made contact with sympathetic
Greek warlords. Subsequently 800 Ottoman cavalry ravaged villages around the edge of
the Gulf (Locatelli 1691, I: 85). At the same moment Ismail Pasha, expecting a rebellion
among the Maniot warlords, began reducing the villages of the region (Locatelli 1691, I:
101). As combat in the Morea intensified, so did Turkish attacks on Greek villages. The
Messenian peninsula, which experienced 4 major sieges in 1685-1686, suffered
especially harsh raids. Ottoman forces withdrawing from their failed relief of Koroni
burned villages and took slaves in late 1685 (Locatelli 1691, I:153). The next year the
approaches to Navarino suffered visits from Turkish cavalry, while Ottoman forces based
at Nifsi raided the countryside right up to the Venetian siegeworks are Methoni (Locatelli
1691, I:236). The heavy combat inflicted upon the Messenian peninsula in a relatively
short period likely explains the intense cluster of abandoned villages present in Map 10,
most of which are in the immediate environs of Methoni.
The Venetian landing at Nauplion sparked Turkish raids throughout the Argolid
valley in the late summer of 1686 (Locatelli 1691, I:247), and by early 1687, as the
Ottoman hold on the Peloponnese continued to weaken, punitive raids transformed into
full-scale ethnic cleansing. Ottoman forces operating out of Corinth began enforced
removal of Greeks from the Peloponnese to the Morea, specifically to depopulate the
landscape (Locatelli 1691, I:297-300). This was a human “scorched earth” strategy,
intended to denude agricultural lands of necessary labor. Even while the coastal centers
fell one-by-one to Morosini’s forces, Turkish cavalry ranged far and wide across the
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Peloponnese, striking as far as the vicinity of Koroni, where they cut the aqueduct
supplying the fortress (Locatell 1691, I:308). Muslim forces continued scouring the
Peloponnese even after region fell, with light cavalry skirting Venetian defenses at
Corinth and devastating the region in 1690 and 1692 (Gradenigo 1692. 244, 425).
Bubonic Plague and the Morea
The bubonic plague epidemics within the Christian army in the spring of 1687
and again in the winter and spring of 1688 did not occur in isolation. Plague had struck
the Peloponnese as recently as 1661 and 1674, and was generally circulating throughout
the Ottoman world (Biraben 1975, Annex IV). Yet the combination of warfare with an
epidemic outbreak created an especially dangerous situation. Warfare entails various
mobilities, including the movement of armies, supply trains, and refugees. In turn, war
also impacts the living environment of commensal species, such as the rodents living
among human habitations. Disruptions in the human habitat immediately effects rodent
colonies, and as humans move, rodents must move as well. The depopulation of cities
removes food resources from urban rodent colonies, while the interruption of normal
agriculture life brought on by conflict disturbs rural rodents. The effects of multi-year
drought throughout the Morea further intensified these disruptions (Map 4a to Map 4e).
Once bubonic plague enters an environment of dynamic mobility, as exists in an active
theater of warfare, widespread outbreaks of the pathogen are certain to follow.
From 1687 through 1689, bubonic plague circulated across the Morean landscape,
and beyond into Attica and Rumelia (Table 6). The major urban centers, especially the
coastal cities, suffered extensive outbreaks, but the contagion spread widely in the
interior as well. Morosini blamed much of the rural circulation of plague in late 1687 on
122

Table 6: Known Plague Outbreaks during the Morean War
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peasants moving in mass around the region, likely reflecting refugee movements
(Laborde 1854, 167-168). The movement of Turkish armies and Greek irregulars,
refugee columns fleeing the effects of war, as well as everyday commerce, all aided the
transmission of plague to every corner of the peninsula. An accounting of plague deaths
among the Morean peasantry does not exist, but in light of the high mortality rate from
plague infections (60-80%), there is little doubt that a large number of civilians perished.
War, Plague, and the Abandonment of Settlements
The Peloponnese likely experienced a long-term demographic decline in the
decades leading up to the Morean War, but the war itself served as a watershed event that
greatly intensified these trends. The spatial distribution of abandoned villages recorded
in the war’s aftermath correlates to the kind of patterns we would expect from a war
coupled with a plague epidemic (Map 10). The main clusters of abandoned villages
occur in immediate proximity of major nodes along Morea roadways, such as Tropolizza,
Leondari, and Androusa, or directly along major roads, as on the Prygos-Karitena road or
the path between Tropolizza and Karitena. Similar hot spots exist on the coastal roads
near Patras and Vostizza. These roadways and crossroads were heavily trafficked by
Turkish forces moving along the internal lines of communication in the region, and these
are the areas most likely to experience raids, massacres, and forced removal. By the
same token these were also the areas most exposed to plague transmission, with the
contagion potentially carried by all who passed by. In most cases we should not attribute
the abandonment of particular villages to either or war or plague, but to a combination of
the two. In this instance violent action coupled with plague to create synergistic effects
along the major transit corridors, resulting in the patterns we see in the data.
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There are several potential outliers. As noted, the most intense cluster of
abandoned villages appears on the Messenian peninsula in the rough triangle between
Navarino, Methoni, and Koroni. This region experienced 4 major sieges with a 12-month
period, as well as the movement of Turkish relief armies and cavalry raids. The existence
of so many destroyed villages, often within sight of the fortress walls, implies a violent
cause. But as noted in Table 6, all three of these major ports experienced repeated
plague outbreaks, and it seems unlikely that quarantine measures prevented the pathogen
from spreading into the hinterlands. Plague may have played a role in the demise of
these villages, though warfare remains the most important catalyst. In contrast, the
cluster of abandoned villages on the slopes of Mt. Panachaiko is most attributable to
plague. The villages sit at altitudes above 1000m, along a dead-end road that curves
around the mountain. This is a remote, inaccessible region unlikely to be targeted by
Ottoman raiders, especially when more easily reached targets existed along the coastal
plains. In addition, plague is known to have spread in the area. The Christian war
council of October 2nd, 1687, specifically lists several plague-ridden villages in the
highlands around Mt. Panakaicho, including Lopesi, Episkopi, Cutegli, Chierpegni, and
Rogas. Girolamo Corner, when conducting his cadastral survey, noted that he saw no
living soul in these very highlands (Miller 1921, 418). Under these circumstances it
makes sense to identify plague as the principal cause of the abandonment of these remote
villages.
Conclusion: Repopulating the Morea
Venetian goals in the Morean War centered on regaining control of the maritime
networks dominating the Eastern Mediterranean, and acquiring new agricultural lands to
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economically exploit. They accomplished both of these goals, but with the severe caveat
that the lands conquered suffered major damage, especially in terms of its human
landscape. Agriculture relies directly on human labor, so Morea lands were useless
without the manpower to tend the fields, pastures, and orchards. With this in mind the
Venetian leadership set in motion a number of strategies to repopulate the Morea and
mitigate the damage future wars or plague outbreaks to the region.
Morosini and his officers, keenly aware of the population loss, leveraged the
ethno-religious fault lines in Greece to their advantage. In the late summer of 1687, as
Turkish forces evacuated the Peloponnese, the Venetians made contact with sympathetic
Greek leaders in Rumelia, on the north side of the Ionian Gulf. Under the leadership of
Philotheus, a local Orthodox bishop, a large contingent of Greeks emigrated from
Rumelia on Venetian galleys and were settled in Vostissa (Locatelli 1691, I:345; Michiel
1691, 212). The evacuation of Athens the next spring allowed Morosini to settle some on
the island of Aegina, and many more around Corinth (Locatelli 1691, II: 50). A similar
population transfer occurred following the withdrawal from Negroponte in late 1688,
with 6000 Evian Greeks fleeing for the Christian controlled Morea (Locatelli 1691, II:
143; Cappelletti 1854, 67).
The policy of enticing Greek Christians to emigrate from Ottoman-held territories
continued under the Venetian Provveditori. Tadeo Gradenigo reported the arrival of
Greeks from Thebes and Livadia in Rumelia, Candiots from Crete, and some Bulgari,
Slavic Christians of unknown provenance. The emigres were granted abandoned houses,
fields, and vineyards, which the Morea possessed in large numbers (Gradenigo 1692,
238). In many villages the Venetian cadasters record separately famiglie del Paese
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(native peasants) as well as famiglie detto Rumeliotte (Rumeliot emigres), reflecting the
redistribution of abandoned properties (Grimani 1700, f.21v). Ironically, by inviting
Greek Christians out of Ottoman territory the Venetians engaged in a kind reverse ethniccleansing. This process of resettlement succeeded to the point that by 1701, Francesco
Grimani counted a population of 176,844 persons in the Morea. Noting the secretive and
superstitious nature of the Greek people, Grimani regarded this as an undercount, and he
believed that the Regno di Morea housed more than 200,000 souls, effectively recovering
the population to its 1530 levels (Grimani 1701, 454).
Grimani, a veteran of the Morean campaigns and well aware of the forces that
depopulated the Morea, took proactive measures to prevent future mass mortality events.
Having witnessed the high death tolls among the German mercenaries during the war due
to “insalubrious airs”, Grimani took pains to only recruit garrison troops “immune to the
mortality of the fatal air” (Grimani 1701, 460-462). In response to the potential
reappearance of plague, Grimani ordered the construction of lazarettos at the major
fortresses. At Corinth he converted the ruins of the classical amphitheater into a lazaretto
at small expense, and Patras a warehouse by the harbor served a similar purpose. An old
harem outside the walls of Pylos assumed this new role, but at Methoni and Monemvasia
Grimani could not identify any appropriate structures for the purpose (Grimani 1701,
489-490).
Preventing further Turkish raids was also a serious concern. Morosini earlier
proposed rebuilding the Hexamilion, a late-Roman defensive wall built across the
Isthmus of Corinth, and his engineers and cartographers even supplied detailed plans for
such a project (Katsiarda-Hering 2018, Billa 134). This project never made much
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headway, and under the Provveditori the concern shifted to repairing and maintaining the
major urban fortifications. The walls of Koroni were especially concerning, considering
the huge breach blown in its walls during the siege in 1685. Antonio Molin,
Provveditore in 1692, failed to close the breach due to a lack of available manpower in
the city. In his relazione to the Senate he proposed that future governors halt resettlement
in the countryside and focus repopulating Koroni, at least until the repairs were
completed (Molin 1693, 439-440). The governors also recruited significant numbers of
dragoons, or heavy cavalry, as garrison troops rather than infantry, as a direct counter to
the possibility of Turkish raids.
The Venetian governors clearly understood the damage done to the Morean
landscape by the war, and they took considerable measures to reverse the depopulation.
They also proactively tried to forestall the ravages of future epidemics and conflicts,
though how effective these measures were is unclear. Certainly, the resettlement
program initiated under Morosini and continuing under the Provveditori was a success,
with the population rebounding to levels not recorded since the 16th century. Yet, did a
repopulated landscape equal a profitable one for the Republic? The governors all
complained that the Regno produced lower profits than anticipated. Viticulture and olive
groves produced the greatest profit on the open market, and thus the Provveditori
encouraged converting fields into vineyards and orchards. Local Greeks resisted turning
away from cereal product, and government exactions on barley and pastureland was
required to support the dragoons of the garrison and their horses, further hampering
economic growth (Topping 1972, 76). So, the Morean War was not as profitable as the
Venetians hoped, but at least in the short-term they held the region.
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CHAPTER VII – CONCLUSION
General Conclusions
It is well known that war and disease coincide. There is a reason these forces are
personified as two of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse depicted in the New
Testament (Rev. 6). Indeed, disease is known to be the primary killer in virtually all wars
across human history prior to the 20th century. Only the recent advent of automatic
weapons, rapid-fire artillery, aerial bombardment, and the other weapons of mass murder
has changed the principal cause of death to combat wounds rather than pestilence. Yet
knowing that disease and war intertwine does not explain why that is the case, or how
these forces specifically interact. This thesis acts as a case study of how armies on
campaign encounter various diseases, suffer from them, and spread them across war-torn
landscapes.
The Morean War took place within a discernible web of sea lanes and roads, and
the war was fought over control of this network. This system acted as a conduit of trade
and allowed the projection of political power, but it also contained endemic diseases
within it and transmitted epidemic disease along it. Thus, the armies and fleets fighting
to control the network risked entering reservoirs of endemic disease. Most battles of the
war took place at critical nexus points within the matrix, including Santa Maura, Preveza,
Methoni, Koroni, Nauplion, and Negroponte, all of which sat within lowland coastal
regions exhibiting high risk for malarial infection. This level of risk is evident within the
Browning Malarial Risk Analysis Model (Map 6), and closely aligns with first-hand
accounts of travelers in the region from the 17th to 19th centuries, as well as the testimony
of Morean War veterans. The timing of the major battles also contributed to higher death
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tolls; most major combat actions took place in July to September each year of the war,
coinciding with the highest period of mosquito propagation.
The unique make-up of Christian armies deployed to the Peloponnese further
exacerbated malarial mortality rates. The various German mercenaries hired to fight the
Turks were among the best trained and best equipped soldiers in Europe, and they played
a major role in defeating Turkish field armies and fortifications. Yet lacking any natural
immunity to malarial infection, the German soldiers died in droves, which hampered the
war effort. The high mortality forced the Venetians to recruit thousands more German
infantry each year, creating a repeating cycle of recruitment, deployment, illness, and
mass mortality. One of the reasons that all the major combat during took place in the
high summer, the worst malarial months, was due to the need to wait on the arrival of
these reinforcements.
The plague epidemics of 1687-1689 further validates the role of network analysis
in understanding disease. It is well established that bubonic plague circulated throughout
the Ottoman Empire from the 14th to the mid-19th century, and some general patterns of
that circulation have been identified by Nukhet Varlik (2015). However, plague
transmission within the Ottoman orbit was far more complex than what is described in
current scholarship. The creation of a Plague Suitability Model allows us to identify
possible reservoirs of endemic plague, which confirms southern/southwestern Anatolia as
a likely incubator of bubonic plague. By combining layers of known plague events,
Ottoman caravan networks, and the Plague Suitability Model (Map 7) we can see how
bubonic plague periodically emanated out of southern Anatolia into the larger Ottoman
network. Once circulating throughout the network, the most important nodes, Istanbul
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and Izmir, acted as distribution centers, transmitting plague to secondary and tertiary
centers. The Morea, a secondary node at the maritime crossroads of the Aegean and
Ionian seas, saw frequent plague outbreaks due to its direct contacts with the primary
transmission points. Warfare, entailing the movement of armies, supply trains and
refugees, exacerbated possible disease spread, as is evident during the Morean War.
The Morean War occurred during one of the worst decades of the Little Ice Age, a
period of global cooling. In Greece and Anatolia, the LIA impacted precipitation, with
heavy rains and snows during exceptionally cold winters, but with severe droughts
evidenced in the summers. Drought conditions directly affect disease, usually by
intensifying epidemic outbreaks. Malarial risk tends to increase during droughts, as
mosquito populations cluster around remaining wetland habitats, and dehydration
encourages more frequent anthropophilic feeding. Similarly, drought disrupts
environments that host colonies of plague infected rodents, encouraging them to move
seeking food resources. By combining the PDSI data from the Old-World Drought Atlas
(OWDA) with the Plague Suitability Model, we can see that the worst drought effects of
the 1680s coincide with areas highly suitable in maintaining endemic plague, especially
in southwestern Anatolia (Map 8). Thus, drought likely intensified plague outbreaks and
made them more frequent. This further suggests that this region was critical in
circulating plague in the Ottoman world.
The Morean landscape suffered heavily during the war, with hundreds of
abandoned settlements dotting the countryside in its aftermath. While this phenomenon
has been studied previously, scholars have not utilized the full range of sources available,
including the maps produced by the Grimani cadastral survey of 1701 (Katsiarda-Hering,
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2018). These maps allow us to map village desertion in the Peloponnese with geographic
precision, and by applying Point Density Analysis to these data, we can identify patterns
of abandonment on the landscape. While the Peloponnese experienced a long-term
demographic decline over the century previous to the Morean War, the pattern of
destruction seen in this analysis suggests more immediate causes. Both Christian and
Turkish forces perpetrated acts of mass murder and ethnic cleansing during the war, and
did so as matters of policy, not happenstance. At the same time war entails the
movement of armies and their logistical trains across landscapes, while violence
encourages the flight of refugees. The disruptions inherent to a war zone, along with the
mass movement of men and livestock, allows for greater transmission of disease,
especially bubonic plague. The patterns of abandonment seen in this study, with deserted
villages clustered near major roadways, crossroads, and near major battle sites, strongly
implies that the war and its attendant plague outbreak were the proximate cause.
Future Study
The present study opens new avenues for continued research. While the Grimani
cadastral maps provided relatively high-resolution data for village abandonment, only a
portion of those maps were available for this study, leaving many lacuna. The full
cadastral survey, Archivio Grimani ai Servi, survives in the State Archives of Venice. In
its complete form the survey includes detailed written descriptions of every village in the
Morea, both inhabited and deserted, and specifically accounts for recent immigrants to
the peninsula. Extended research in the archive, when feasible, will allow for a complete
accounting of village abandonment in the Morea, as well as establishing patterns of
immigration designed to fill the demographic void.
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The Plague Suitability Model (Map 7) produced here is well grounded in current
research on modern plague reservoirs, yet much work remains. One of the major
weaknesses of the model is the dearth of information on plague outbreaks in immediate
proximity to the disease reservoirs in southern/southwestern Anatolia. Epidemic
outbreaks certainly occurred in these areas, yet the sources we possess, mostly European
observers, only witness these plague events as they move toward the major trade nodes,
including Istanbul and Izmir. Filling in this lacuna requires further archival work in the
unpublished records of various European diplomats, notably the British consuls at Izmir
in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. These records are accessible in the Levant
Company holdings of the National Archives of the United Kingdom.
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